Russia’s Gasoline Crisis: How Ukrainian Drone Strikes Exposed the Limits of Putin’s Energy Defences

Speaking at the Eastern Economic Forum, Vladimir Putin issued a rare public admission: Russia was unprepared for Ukraine’s relentless drone strikes on its oil refineries. As domestic fuel shortages spread to over 17 regions and production drops to 20-year lows, the world's former energy superpower has been forced into an extraordinary reversal - importing emergency gasoline by sea to prevent an economic logistics collapse.
The deeper problem is not simply a temporary shortage. Ukraine has exposed a structural weakness in Russia's energy system: abundant crude oil is of limited value when the industrial capacity to turn it into usable fuel becomes the bottleneck.
A refinery war with economic consequences
Ukrainian drones have struck Russian oil refineries at least 70 times since the beginning of 2026. The cumulative effect has pushed national refining volumes to their lowest level in two decades.
Seven refineries completely or partially halted production in August alone. On September 2, KINEF in Kirishi, Russia's second-largest refinery, stopped processing altogether. With an annual capacity of about 20mn tonnes, its shutdown illustrates why repeated attacks can have an impact far beyond the individual facilities hit.
Refining infrastructure is expensive, concentrated and difficult to replace quickly. Russia can continue extracting crude while losing the industrial machinery required to convert it into gasoline, diesel and aviation fuel. That disconnect is precisely what makes the campaign economically potent.
By late August, the resulting domestic gasoline deficit had reached 30,000-35,000 tonnes a day. Between May and September, oil companies failed to fulfil about 60 per cent of gasoline supply contracts on the Saint Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange, while 20 per cent of trades failed altogether.
The state has responded with increasingly direct intervention. Gasoline exports, already restricted in July, have been banned through January 31, 2027. Diesel exports are restricted through the end of September.
Those measures can preserve domestic supply for a time. They cannot create refining capacity.
From national surplus to emergency imports
The most revealing measure of the crisis is perhaps not the queues or rationing, but Russia's changing position in the international fuel market.
In August, seaborne gasoline imports reached about 125,000 barrels a day, or roughly 470,000 tonnes for the month. India was the main supplier, with nearly 1mn barrels delivered over two months, alongside supplies from Turkey and Morocco. Belarus also increased fuel deliveries to Russia to record levels.
The Indian connection carries an additional irony. Nayara Energy, whose Vadinar refinery can process about 20mn tonnes a year, is nearly half-owned by Rosneft. Russian crude can therefore be processed abroad, and the resulting products sent back into a market where Russia can no longer reliably meet its own requirements.
This is not the normal pattern of an energy superpower.
Russia's historical advantage was built on the combination of enormous crude production and a large refining base capable of generating a substantial export surplus of finished petroleum products. That model is now under pressure from the opposite direction: crude remains available, while the downstream system is increasingly constrained.
A similar problem is emerging in aviation fuel. Ukrainian intelligence reports that Russia has imported at least 70,000 tonnes of Jet A-1 from South Korea and Egypt since late August after strikes on jet-fuel production facilities.
The significance extends beyond civilian aviation. Fuel is the connective tissue of a modern military and industrial economy.
Crimea shows what a prolonged bottleneck looks like
The most severe disruption is in occupied Crimea, where the refinery problem has collided with a logistics problem.
Fuel trains, bridges and tankers have been targeted, while maritime drone attacks on July 11 damaged up to 21 tankers in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. Russia subsequently restricted navigation through the Kerch Strait, further complicating the movement of petroleum products into the peninsula.
From September 3, Crimean filling stations have been selling fuel for only four hours a day, between 08:00 and 10:00 and between 18:00 and 20:00, with a 20-litre limit per vehicle. In Sevastopol, some allocations are controlled through QR codes providing 20-40 litres.
Officially capped prices for AI-95 at selected networks stand at 100 roubles a litre. Unofficial prices have reached 160-260 roubles.
Crimea is therefore becoming a concentrated demonstration of the broader problem. A fuel shortage becomes substantially more damaging when production, rail, road and maritime routes are all vulnerable at once.
Elsewhere, the symptoms are less extreme but increasingly difficult to dismiss. Some central regions have imposed limits of 30-60 litres per vehicle, while Zabaykalsky Krai has reduced the limit to 15 litres. Kaluga has used odd-even licence-plate rationing. In several territories, fuel availability at filling stations has fallen below 30 per cent.
In Perm Krai, schools have moved to remote learning because there was insufficient fuel for school buses.
These are not merely consumer inconveniences. They show how a disruption at industrial facilities can migrate through public services, agriculture, transport and retail.
The fiscal cost is arriving at the worst moment
Russia is confronting this industrial shock while its energy revenues are already under pressure.
Net oil revenues fell to 326bn roubles in August, down 22 per cent year on year and more than 60 per cent from July. Total oil and gas revenues fell 16 per cent year on year to 424bn roubles.
Yet the state is simultaneously spending heavily to keep the domestic refining system functioning. Refineries received more than 197bn roubles in subsidies in August alone, bringing payments since January to almost 916bn roubles.
That creates an awkward fiscal equation. The Kremlin is losing revenue from the energy sector while increasing the amount it must spend to prevent disruption inside it.
The pressure is compounded by lower crude production expectations. Official projections for 2026 have been revised down to 494.2mn tonnes, the lowest national production figure since 2009.
Fuel shortages therefore arrive not as an isolated industrial accident but against a deteriorating energy balance.
Air defence has a geographic problem
Putin's stated answer is to strengthen air defences around critical infrastructure. Oil companies are also being expected to develop their own protection measures, shifting part of the burden from the state to private operators.
But the scale of Russia's industrial geography creates a fundamental problem.
Protecting a small number of strategic military sites is one thing. Shielding a vast network of fixed refineries and associated infrastructure from repeated, long-range drone attacks is another. The more infrastructure that must be defended, the more difficult it becomes to concentrate finite air-defence assets where they can provide comprehensive protection.
For Russia, that creates a strategic trade-off. Air-defence systems positioned around refineries and other interior industrial facilities are not available elsewhere, including near the front.
The Ukrainian campaign does not need to destroy the entire Russian refining system in a single strike. It only needs to make the system unreliable enough that repairs, rerouting and imports cannot restore normality faster than further disruption occurs.
That is a different kind of attrition from the destruction of conventional military formations.
The autumn test
The next pressure point is logistics.
Fuel shortages affect agricultural machinery, freight, school transport and civilian mobility. They also complicate military supply chains, particularly when aviation fuel itself has become an import requirement.
The emergency landing of a Mi-8 helicopter in Sakhalin on September 2, after both engines failed from complete fuel exhaustion five kilometres short of its airfield, is an unusually stark illustration of how a national fuel problem can become an operational problem.
Russia can impose export bans. It can subsidise refineries. It can redirect supplies through Belarus or import gasoline from India, Turkey and Morocco. Those measures buy time.
They also change the economics of the system.
Foreign suppliers gain leverage while Russian companies absorb repair costs and lose access to profitable refined-product exports. The state has to compensate producers even as its energy revenues weaken. And every additional emergency shipment exposes Russia to dependence on routes and suppliers outside its control.
The longer refinery repairs take, the more consequential that dependence becomes. Putin has estimated that roughly 10 per cent of currently lost refining capacity will return in the near future, but the strategic question is what happens if restoration cannot keep pace with continued attacks.
Russia's energy system was designed around scale, concentration and export strength. Ukraine's drone campaign is testing whether that same concentration has become a vulnerability.
For Moscow, the problem is no longer simply how to intercept the next drone. It is how to defend an industrial system whose most valuable assets cannot move, whose replacement takes time, and whose failure now has to be compensated for with scarce budget resources and fuel bought from abroad.
Read also:
- Russia’s federal budget deficit has already exceeded the government’s full-year target, highlighting the growing fiscal cost of sustaining the country’s wartime economy. Low public debt gives Moscow room to borrow and use reserves, but weaker growth, falling oil production and persistent inflation are steadily narrowing that financial flexibility.
Sources: Ground News, Military, Vortexa, The Moscow Times.
