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Yemen Offensive: How the Battle for Taiz Threatens Red Sea Shipping and Suez Trade

Elise Aranda
Posted October 5, 2026 · 7 views
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Yemen Offensive: How the Battle for Taiz Threatens Red Sea Shipping and Suez Trade
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Yemen’s government has launched a counteroffensive after Iran-backed Houthis severed the critical Taiz–Aden highway, threatening a total siege on Taiz. While Aden vows to recapture Sanaa, the immediate fight is over the Bab el-Mandeb corridor - raising urgent alarm for European energy supplies, trade routes, and the EU’s Aspides naval mission.

That distinction matters because the conflict is no longer behaving like a contained Yemeni civil war. Local territorial gains are increasingly translating into leverage over international trade.

The immediate trigger was a rapid Houthi advance around Taiz. In the preceding 48 hours, the movement seized the Al-Safiya district, a police station and strategically important hilltops, cutting the Taiz–Aden highway. The road had been the final major supply artery connecting government forces in Taiz with the southern coast.

With hundreds of thousands of civilians and thousands of government troops inside the city, its closure creates the conditions for a siege.

For the Presidential Leadership Council, waiting is therefore becoming more dangerous than fighting.

A maximalist war aim, a defensive military problem

The language of “fully liberating” Yemen disguises the weakness of the forces expected to deliver it.

The Presidential Leadership Council was created to bring anti-Houthi factions under a common political authority, but its military forces remain fragmented. Southern secessionists, tribal militias and national army units operate under different interests and chains of command. A campaign aimed at Sanaa would therefore require not merely battlefield momentum but sustained coordination among forces that have historically struggled to function as a single army.

The geography is equally unforgiving. The Houthis retain control of Sanaa and the densely populated northern highlands, while government forces depend heavily on southern bases and a coalition whose willingness to sustain another open-ended war cannot be assumed.

The declaration is therefore better understood as an emergency counteroffensive than as a credible timetable for reconquering Yemen.

The first test will be Taiz.

Saudi-backed forces have already intensified air and artillery operations. Yemeni government military structures reported 257 operations against Houthi positions across several fronts, including 97 precision strikes against reinforcements around Taiz and Lahj. Government sources also claimed more than 960 Houthi fighters had been killed and more than 214 military vehicles destroyed during two operational series. Those figures have not been independently verified.

The numbers matter less than the strategic purpose of the campaign: breaking the pressure around Taiz before the Houthis can turn a disrupted supply line into a sustained siege.

That is a much more limited objective than taking Sanaa. It is also one that Riyadh and its partners may find harder to avoid.

Taiz and Bab el-Mandeb are now part of the same battlefield

The significance of the Taiz offensive lies partly outside Taiz itself.

Last month, Houthi forces seized the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and around 150 kilometres of Red Sea coastline. That gave the movement an unusual combination of territorial and maritime leverage. Control of the coastline can support pressure on a shipping route linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, while advances inland can protect the movement's position around that corridor.

The result is a strategic connection between two apparently separate battles.

The road to Taiz runs through territory that can help secure the Houthis' western and southern position. Bab el-Mandeb, meanwhile, provides leverage over one of the principal maritime routes between Asia and Europe. A movement that can threaten both the land corridor and the coast has considerably more bargaining power than one confined to Yemen's interior.

This is the larger change in the war.

For years, the conflict could be managed, however imperfectly, through a combination of local truces, political fragmentation and Saudi air power. The informal de-escalation that followed the 2022 UN-brokered truce largely preserved that equilibrium even after the formal truce expired.

That model has now broken down.

The Houthis have demonstrated that territorial control can be converted into pressure on a global economic artery. The question for Saudi Arabia, the US and Europe is no longer simply whether the Yemeni government can recover territory. It is whether allowing the Houthis to consolidate around Bab el-Mandeb creates a security problem that cannot later be contained without much greater military and economic costs.

Saudi Arabia is being pulled back into the war

Riyadh had spent years seeking a way out of Yemen's war. The renewed fighting is forcing it back towards the role it had tried to leave behind.

Saudi Arabia is leading the coalition's air operations and reconnaissance, while Yemeni forces conduct ground operations. Washington is providing intelligence to support Riyadh's preparations. Other regional and European countries are supplying defensive military assistance to Saudi Arabia.

That division of labour is significant. It allows the coalition to increase pressure without immediately committing to a conventional ground invasion by Saudi forces. But it also leaves the central military problem unresolved: air power can disrupt Houthi formations, while the forces needed to retake and hold territory remain divided among Yemeni factions.

The Houthis, meanwhile, have another means of imposing costs on Riyadh.

They have claimed responsibility for ballistic missile and heavy-drone attacks against Saudi Aramco facilities in Riyadh and Khurais, saying the strikes caused major fires in retaliation for Saudi-led attacks. Coalition sources rejected the claims as misleading, and there is no independent confirmation of damage. Even so, the episode illustrates the vulnerability Saudi Arabia faces when it resumes a high-intensity campaign.

The wider confrontation with Iran makes that vulnerability more difficult to isolate.

Since the outbreak of direct US-Israeli military conflict with Iran in February, Tehran has faced military pressure and leadership attrition. The Houthis' renewed attacks on Saudi targets and commercial shipping have provided Iran with a means of widening that pressure geographically without relying on a conventional Iranian deployment.

Bab el-Mandeb can therefore function as a second pressure point alongside the Strait of Hormuz.

That forces Washington and its partners to spread military resources across two maritime chokepoints rather than concentrating them on the Gulf.

Europe inherits the cost

For European governments, Yemen's renewed war is not a distant security problem.

Bab el-Mandeb is the southern gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, making disruption there directly relevant to European shipping, energy supplies and manufacturing chains. If commercial vessels are forced to avoid the Red Sea, voyages around the Cape of Good Hope can add roughly two weeks. The costs then propagate through freight rates, insurance premiums, delivery times and transport-driven inflation.

The renewed conflict therefore creates a peculiar asymmetry: a Yemeni armed movement can impose costs on European economies without possessing the capacity to attack those economies directly.

Europe's military response is already being adjusted. The EU's Operation Aspides, which operates defensively to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea, has raised its readiness as the threat has intensified. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has called on member states to increase the force from six warships to more than ten.

Whether that will be enough is another question.

Aspides is designed to defend shipping, not conduct land strikes against Houthi positions. If attacks from the Yemeni coast intensify alongside the ground offensive, European naval forces could find themselves defending an increasingly exposed commercial corridor while lacking the mandate or capacity to eliminate the source of the threat.

That is the strategic trap created by the new phase of the war.

The humanitarian clock is running faster

The military calculations around Taiz cannot be separated from the civilian consequences.

The city has already endured years of partial siege. The loss of its final southern supply route risks turning an existing humanitarian emergency into a far more severe one, particularly if fighting cuts aid corridors and accelerates displacement.

Three out of four families in affected areas are already suffering from acute hunger. A prolonged encirclement of a densely populated city would place further pressure on food supplies, medical access, and civilian movement.

That creates an uncomfortable hierarchy of priorities for the government in Aden. Its public objective is the liberation of the country. Its immediate operational requirement is to keep Taiz from being strangled.

The distinction may determine whether the offensive succeeds at all.

If the government and its partners cannot reopen the Taiz–Aden artery, the political declaration of a nationwide campaign risks becoming disconnected from the military balance. If they do manage to break the encirclement, they will still face the much larger question of whether the fragmented coalition can sustain an offensive while the Houthis retain Sanaa, the northern highlands and their newly acquired leverage along the Red Sea.

The deeper problem is that Yemen's war has acquired a new geography. A battle over a road outside Taiz can now affect a maritime passage thousands of kilometres away, while pressure on that passage can feed back into decisions made in Aden, Riyadh, Washington and European capitals.

That is why the offensive announced by al-Alimi is bigger than its stated objective. The immediate fight is for Taiz. The strategic contest is over whether the Houthis can turn control of Yemen's coastline into durable leverage over one of the world's most important trade corridors.

Sources: Reuters, CNA, Aljazeera, DW

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