Testing NATO’s Limits: Why Russia’s Hybrid War Is Already on Europe’s Doorstep

Russia's war against Ukraine is no longer confined to the battlefield. Moscow is testing Western political resolve, probing European security through sabotage and hybrid operations, and looking for opportunities to exploit divisions inside NATO and the European Union.
Professor Tony Meehan, a British Political Communications Analyst, shared these views in the latest episode of Russia Unmasked, where he spoke with journalist Andriy Bohdanovich about Russia's war against Ukraine, Moscow's activities in Europe, the future of NATO and the political forces shaping European policy towards Kyiv.
In his view, the question facing Europe is no longer whether Russia poses a threat. It is how far Moscow is prepared to go - and whether Europe is prepared to respond.
Recent developments provide several reasons for concern.
Witkoff's Moscow visit: sanctions, negotiations and Putin's own agenda
Steve Witkoff's visit to Moscow and his talks with Russian officials lasted more than three hours. The Kremlin described the discussions as constructive and substantive, but there was no immediate confirmation of concrete agreements or next steps.
One detail was particularly significant: the US delegation included a Treasury official responsible for sanctions against Russia.
That suggests the sanctions regime is having an effect. Russia has an obvious interest in finding a way around those measures, and negotiations may provide one possible route.
But there is another issue that should not be forgotten.
Putin has rejected the Ukrainian peace plan presented earlier in the week. His position remains focused on his own plan, and he appears prepared to pursue it regardless of the cost to both Russia and Ukraine.
Until there is more information about the outcome of the talks, the Moscow visit can be regarded as potentially positive for Russia and the United States. For Ukraine, however, it is too early to know whether it will produce any tangible benefit.
Russian sabotage and the widening security threat
Germany's accusation that Russia was behind a failed attack involving an explosive-laden drone at Leipzig Airport is another indication of how the nature of the confrontation is changing.
Russia has already been accused of cyberattacks, sabotage and recruiting operatives across Europe. An attempt to target a major civilian airport would represent another escalation.
The distinction between hybrid warfare and direct military confrontation remains important.
As long as Russian military forces are not openly operating on NATO territory, in NATO airspace or at sea, Moscow can deny that it is conducting military action against the Alliance.
Russia could also attempt to use a third party.
Belarus is one obvious example. Moscow could potentially exploit its alliance with Minsk and present military action as a response to an alleged attack by a NATO state against Belarusian territory.
The reported movement of Russian troops into Belarus therefore deserves close attention.
Was it primarily a political demonstration of support for an ally? Was it intended as a message to NATO? Or could it form part of preparations for a potential military operation?
Europe cannot afford to assume that the least dangerous explanation is automatically the correct one.
Russia's war against Ukraine has already demonstrated that Moscow is willing to accept enormous military and economic costs in pursuit of its objectives. If an opportunity arose to attack Kyiv or expand the conflict into Poland or the Baltic states, that possibility should be taken seriously.
Ukraine and NATO members should therefore prepare for the worst rather than assume that Russia will voluntarily limit the scope of the confrontation.
Why Western support for Ukraine still matters
For more than four years, the West - including the European Union, NATO, the United States and Canada - has demonstrated its support for Ukraine.
That support must continue.
Any visible weakening of Western commitment would send a message to Vladimir Putin that Western governments are losing interest.
The support given to Ukraine has achieved two things. It has allowed Ukraine to defend itself, and it has helped prevent Russia from expanding its war into Western Europe.
This broader strategic dimension is sometimes forgotten.
Putin's long-term ambitions cannot be assessed solely through the immediate objectives of the war in Ukraine. His confrontation with the West is also connected to his political survival at home.
Putin is committed to winning his war against Ukraine. At the same time, a larger confrontation with NATO could provide him with a powerful political narrative if he were able to portray Russia as being under attack or defending itself and its allies.
That narrative is important because the Russian political system relies heavily on the idea that Russia is permanently threatened from outside.
Russia is presented as the victim. Its enemies are portrayed as attempting to destroy it. Any confrontation with the West can therefore be used to reinforce the legitimacy of the Kremlin.
Putin has not used nuclear weapons in the war against Ukraine. But the possibility of nuclear escalation, including the threat or appearance of a willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot simply be dismissed.
At the same time, there are signs that the internal political environment in Russia should not be ignored.
Videos allegedly showing protests and growing criticism of the authorities are appearing online. Whether such activity develops into a wider movement is impossible to know.
But authoritarian systems can appear stable until the moment they are not.
The possibility of growing internal opposition raises another question: would the authorities suppress such movements, potentially with violence, or would the protests become the beginning of a broader challenge to Putin's rule?
Anything remains possible.
France could become another battlefield for Russian influence
Russia's influence in Europe is not limited to sabotage.
Moscow also benefits when European political movements weaken support for Ukraine.
Marine Le Pen's political camp has argued that, if it comes to power, France could reduce or end military support for Ukraine. Édouard Philippe has warned that ending such support would amount to helping Russia and would create a security threat for France itself.
The political significance of this debate goes beyond France.
Le Pen's support is rooted in a relatively stable group of voters, but the larger question is whether French voters who are dissatisfied with Emmanuel Macron will automatically transfer that dissatisfaction into support for her political programme.
I do not believe that ending support for Ukraine necessarily has major appeal among French voters.
French voters have domestic concerns that are more immediate to them. At the same time, many understand that Ukraine's resistance has also benefited France and the wider European security system.
French men and women are not fighting on the Ukrainian front. France continues to enjoy peace at home.
That is an important point for politicians who oppose reducing support for Ukraine to make.
If Le Pen were to win power, however, the consequences could be much larger than a change in French foreign policy.
A French government seeking to distance itself from European and transatlantic structures could seriously weaken the coalition supporting Ukraine. The possibility of France moving away from the EU or NATO would represent far more than a symbolic political victory for Putin.
French voters therefore need to ask themselves how deeply Russia is attempting to influence their political environment.
Russia has every reason to encourage divisions between mainstream democratic parties and political movements that are more sympathetic to Moscow's position.
The objective would not necessarily be to install a government directly controlled by Russia. Creating political fragmentation may be enough.
Russian assets: Europe should not be intimidated
There is another area where Europe can impose costs on Russia: its frozen assets.
Billions of euros in Russian state assets remain frozen in Europe. The debate over whether these assets should ultimately be transferred to Ukraine continues, while individual cases are beginning to demonstrate that Russian property can be targeted.
Norway's seizure of the Russian vessel Professor Molchanov, following a request from Ukraine's state-owned energy company Naftogaz, is an example of this approach.
Ukraine is seeking compensation for property seized by Russia following the occupation of Crimea.
Europe should not be intimidated by Russian threats - whether legal, political, or military.
That does not mean acting recklessly. It means preparing for the consequences and understanding the risks before taking action.
Russian assets should be used wherever legally possible.
The question is also practical. Can Russia realistically pay war reparations to Ukraine at the end of the war?
Given the condition of the Russian economy, that is highly unlikely.
The sensible approach is therefore to identify Russian state assets worldwide and establish exactly what can be legally targeted.
This should happen step by step.
A systematic inventory of Russian assets would allow governments to understand what is available before taking further action. It is better to proceed carefully and methodically than to create the impression of indiscriminate confiscation.
Russia may be shrinking on the map - but geography does not determine power
The United Nations General Assembly's decision to promote the Equal Earth projection has generated an unusual debate about how the world is represented on maps.
The traditional Mercator projection exaggerates the apparent size of territories at higher latitudes. As a result, Russia, Canada, and Greenland appear significantly larger relative to countries closer to the equator.
The Equal Earth projection provides a more accurate representation of the relative areas of continents. The UN General Assembly endorsed the relevant resolution on September 4, 2026, with 164 countries voting in favour, the United States voting against, and six countries abstaining.
But the political importance of this decision is difficult to understand.
A map does not change the size or power of a country.
Russia is the size of Russia. Ukraine is the size of Ukraine.
The strength of a state is determined by its government, its people, its institutions, its military capabilities and its relationship with other countries — not by how large it appears on a piece of paper.
Ukraine has demonstrated this extraordinarily clearly.
Through the determination of its citizens, the sacrifice of its military and civilians, and its refusal to surrender its national identity, Ukraine has shown that physical size does not determine a country's influence in the world.
Russia, meanwhile, should not automatically be described as a superpower.
A superpower does not simply possess territory, nuclear weapons, or military resources. It also needs the capacity to project legitimate power and command international respect.
Russia's invasion of a peaceful neighbouring state has demonstrated the opposite.
Ukraine has achieved something Russia failed to achieve: it has demonstrated a nation's ability to defend its identity, sovereignty, and independence against a much larger aggressor.
That is why the size of Russia on a map matters far less than the political reality behind it.
Russia is an invading state.
It is not a superpower simply because a map makes it look large.
Professor Tony Meehan
