Poland Indicts Ukrainian Over Russian Railway Sabotage as Moscow’s Hybrid Threat Grows

The prosecution of a suspected Russian intelligence operative follows an attempted train derailment and comes amid growing concern over Moscow’s use of recruited agents to attack European infrastructure.
Polish prosecutors have filed an indictment against a Ukrainian national accused of assisting Russian intelligence in a series of railway sabotage attacks in November 2025. The defendant, identified as Volodymyr B. under Polish privacy law, faces charges linked to espionage, sabotage and endangering railway traffic. He could receive a life sentence if convicted. The case highlights a wider security challenge for Poland and its European allies as Russian-linked operations increasingly target civilian infrastructure.
The indictment was announced on 12 November 2026 by Poland’s National Prosecutor’s Office, according to Notes from Poland and a statement published by prosecutors on X.
The prosecution alleges that Volodymyr B. helped prepare attacks on railway infrastructure near Mika and Gołąb, along a strategically important route connecting Warsaw with eastern Poland. Investigators say his involvement included reconnaissance, logistical assistance and preparations that enabled other suspects to carry out the attacks.
The indictment marks a significant development in a case that has remained under investigation for nearly a year. Although the two alleged principal perpetrators fled Poland shortly after the incidents, Volodymyr B. was detained in November 2025 and has remained subject to criminal proceedings.
The allegations have not yet been established by a court.
How the November 2025 Railway Attacks Unfolded
The attacks took place on 15–16 November 2025 along railway line No. 7, which connects Warsaw with Dorohusk near the Ukrainian border.
According to the Polish National Prosecutor’s Office, the perpetrators placed military-grade C4 explosives on railway tracks near Mika and detonated them beneath a passing freight train at approximately 20:58 on 15 November.
The explosion caused relatively limited damage to the train but demonstrated the potential for a much more serious accident.
In a separate incident near Gołąb, the attackers damaged railway infrastructure and installed specially constructed metal components on the tracks. A passenger train carrying 475 people subsequently had to brake after encountering the damaged section.
No injuries were reported.
Investigators concluded that the incidents created an immediate danger of a railway catastrophe, potentially threatening numerous passengers and causing extensive property damage.
The official investigation also established that recording devices had been installed to capture the attacks.
Polish prosecutors described the suspected objectives as extending beyond physical destruction. They alleged that the operation was intended to intimidate the public, undermine confidence in national security and destabilise public order.
The Alleged Role of Volodymyr B.
According to prosecutors, Volodymyr B. participated in preparations for the attacks several weeks before they occurred.
In September 2025, he allegedly transported one of the principal suspects, Yevhenii I., to locations along the railway line near Mika and Gołąb.
Investigators say the visit allowed the suspected attacker to examine the terrain, identify suitable locations for explosives and prepare the placement of recording equipment and metal devices on the tracks.
Polish authorities detained Volodymyr B. on 20 November 2025. Two days later, prosecutors formally accused him of assisting sabotage operations and acting on behalf of Russian intelligence.
The latest indictment moves the case towards trial before the Warsaw Regional Court.
The most serious offence carries a minimum sentence of ten years in prison and a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.
The National Prosecutor’s Office has previously stated that the investigation involves cooperation between prosecutors, the Internal Security Agency (ABW) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBŚP).
Two Suspected Attackers Remain at Large
The indictment does not resolve the question of the two men accused of directly carrying out the railway attacks.
Polish authorities have identified them as Yevhenii Ivanov and Oleksandr Kononov.
Following the incidents, Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced that the suspects had entered Poland from Belarus shortly before the attacks and returned across the border afterwards.
He attributed the operation to Russian intelligence services, alleging that Moscow had recruited the two Ukrainian nationals to execute the sabotage.
In December 2025, Interpol issued red notices concerning the suspects. Their whereabouts remain publicly unconfirmed.
The cross-border dimension of the case illustrates one of the difficulties European investigators face when pursuing suspected Russian intelligence operations: individuals accused of executing attacks may leave the country before authorities establish their identities or obtain sufficient evidence to detain them.
Why Poland Has Become a Major Target of Russian Sabotage
Poland occupies a particularly sensitive position in Europe's security architecture.
As a NATO member bordering Ukraine, Belarus and Russia's Kaliningrad exclave, it serves as an important logistical and political hub for Western assistance to Kyiv.
Its railway network, roads, airports and transport facilities support civilian commerce as well as the movement of humanitarian and military assistance.
This makes transport infrastructure a potentially attractive target for hostile intelligence operations.
An attack does not necessarily have to cause large-scale destruction to achieve strategic effects. Even limited damage can trigger inspections, disrupt schedules, increase security expenditure and generate uncertainty about the reliability of essential transport networks.
The November 2025 railway incidents illustrate that vulnerability. Although the immediate physical consequences were limited, the alleged attempts to derail trains exposed a threat to civilian safety and raised wider questions about infrastructure protection.
A February 2026 study by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), produced with GLOBSEC, identified Poland as the country most frequently affected by Russian-linked sabotage incidents in its dataset.

The researchers documented 151 Russian-linked incidents across Europe between February 2022 and February 2026, including 31 in Poland.
They also identified 172 alleged perpetrators, approximately 95% of whom were civilians without formal institutional ties to Russian intelligence services.
This distinction matters because the use of civilian recruits can make hostile operations more difficult to identify, prevent and attribute.
The researchers cautioned that their dataset likely understates the actual scale of activity because some incidents only become public after lengthy investigations.
Russia’s Recruitment Model Complicates European Security
One recurring feature of suspected Russian sabotage operations is the recruitment of individuals who do not formally belong to Russian intelligence agencies.
Investigations and security assessments have described the use of online messaging platforms, financial incentives and cryptocurrency payments to recruit people for reconnaissance, arson and other disruptive activities.
Such networks can offer several advantages to the intelligence services directing them.
Recruitment costs may be relatively low, operational participants can be replaced, and multiple layers between organisers and perpetrators can complicate attribution.
The recruitment of foreign nationals also introduces a political dimension.
In Poland, several investigations have involved Ukrainian and Belarusian citizens accused of acting on Russian orders. Their nationality, however, does not establish responsibility on the part of Ukraine or Belarus as states.
The distinction is especially important in the Polish-Ukrainian relationship, where Russian intelligence operations can potentially exploit existing political tensions and public concerns about security.
In January 2026, Ukraine's ambassador to Poland, Vasyl Bodnar, publicly warned Ukrainian citizens against accepting offers to conduct sabotage in exchange for money.
He also emphasised Ukrainian cooperation with Polish authorities in identifying suspected perpetrators.
New Arrests Suggest the Threat Has Not Disappeared
The indictment against Volodymyr B. comes just two days after Polish authorities announced another investigation involving suspected Russian-directed espionage and sabotage.
On 10 November 2026, prosecutors disclosed charges against two Ukrainian men, aged 24 and 25, detained by the Internal Security Agency.
Investigators allege that the suspects conducted reconnaissance of critical infrastructure and military facilities and participated in vehicle arson operations.
According to prosecutors, some vehicles were fitted with licence plates resembling those used by Ukrainian military vehicles before being set on fire.
The alleged objective was to encourage anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland.
The accusations suggest that suspected Russian-directed operations are not limited to damaging infrastructure. They may also seek to manipulate public perceptions and undermine relations between countries supporting Ukraine.
Both suspects have been placed in pretrial detention. Their guilt has not been established.
Reuters reported on the arrests on 10 November, noting that Moscow has repeatedly denied accusations of conducting sabotage and other hybrid operations in Poland.
From Railway Attacks to Arson Across Europe
The railway case is part of a wider series of criminal investigations concerning suspected Russian-directed attacks in European countries.
In October 2026, four men went on trial in Warsaw over alleged participation in an organised group responsible for arson attacks in Poland and Lithuania.
Prosecutors linked the group to incidents involving commercial properties, including an IKEA store in Vilnius and an OBI store in Warsaw.
The investigation also concerned alleged preparations for further attacks.
Another investigation involved explosive and incendiary devices concealed inside courier packages.
In January 2026, Polish prosecutors indicted five people accused of participating in a Russian-directed operation that sent dangerous packages through European delivery networks.
Three packages ignited during transport, including incidents at facilities connected to Birmingham and Leipzig airports.
The cases demonstrate how suspected sabotage can extend across national borders and involve ordinary commercial infrastructure.
What the Case Means for European Infrastructure Security
The prosecution of Volodymyr B. highlights a security problem that extends beyond Poland's borders.
Railways, logistics facilities and commercial distribution networks are essential to the functioning of Europe's economy. They also play a role in NATO mobility planning and the movement of assistance to Ukraine.
Disruption to these systems can have consequences far beyond the immediate location of an attack.
The Polish case demonstrates how reconnaissance, relatively limited logistical support and access to vulnerable infrastructure can become components of a potentially lethal operation.
It also raises questions about how European governments can identify preparatory activity before an attack occurs.
The use of foreign recruits and cross-border networks makes cooperation between national intelligence agencies, police forces and prosecutors particularly important.
Yet the challenge is not solely operational. Authorities must also communicate the findings of investigations accurately, distinguishing proven criminal responsibility from allegations and avoiding the collective attribution of guilt to particular national communities.
For Poland, the forthcoming trial offers an opportunity to test the prosecution's evidence in court and clarify the alleged role of one suspect in the 2025 attacks.
For the wider European security community, the case provides another example of how suspected Russian intelligence activity can turn civilian transport infrastructure into a target of geopolitical confrontation.
Source: Notes from Poland, Polish National Prosecutor’s Office, Notes from Poland, Reuters, Notes from Poland, ICCT, Polish National Prosecutor’s Office
