Dragons and Snakes: MI5 Chief Warns Europe Faces a New Era of Hybrid Threats

Addressing the 25th anniversary of September 11, MI5 head Sir Ken McCallum warned that the UK and its European allies face returning state adversaries alongside terrorist networks. From Russian sabotage on European factories to state-sponsored cyber attacks, the burden of Western resilience has shifted to the private sector.
The implication is uncomfortable. In 2026, a national security crisis may begin in a corporate boardroom long before it reaches a government emergency room.
Two threats, one security problem
McCallum framed the change through an updated version of an old Cold War metaphor. Former CIA director James Woolsey once described the post-Cold War world as a landscape in which the Soviet “dragon” had been defeated, leaving the West to contend with poisonous “snakes” - non-state terrorist groups.
McCallum’s warning reverses that assumption. The dragons have returned, he argued, while the snakes remain.
The distinction is important because the two threats operate according to fundamentally different logic. Islamist extremist organisations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS continue to pursue terrorist attacks, and the UK’s terrorism threat level remains at “Substantial”, meaning an attack is considered likely. But governments are now also dealing with states capable of combining espionage, cyber operations, sabotage, political interference and the use of criminal proxies.
That creates a security problem that cannot be compartmentalised.
The post-9/11 architecture was built around a relatively clear priority: identify terrorist networks, disrupt their financing and communications, and dismantle their operational infrastructure through intelligence and, where necessary, military force. The campaigns that followed focused heavily on non-state organisations operating beyond Western borders.
The emerging model is different. A hostile state does not necessarily need to send soldiers across a border to damage an adversary. It can outsource an arson attack, exploit a criminal network, interfere with digital infrastructure or target a company involved in defence production while retaining distance from the operation itself.
The cost of such activity can be low. The disruption can be disproportionate.
Europe is already seeing the new battlefield
A series of incidents across Europe during the summer has given this shift a physical dimension.
In Germany, an explosive-laden drone targeted a Ukrainian Antonov aircraft in Leipzig on August 4, with German authorities attributing the operation to Russia. A defence manufacturer in Bulgaria, EMCO, suffered a fire on August 10. Three days later, an explosion and arson attack struck the KNDS Ammo Italy plant near Rome.
Estonia’s Milrem Robotics, a developer of drones, was targeted by arson on August 15. Slovak police later thwarted an alleged arson plot against a Ukrainian drone manufacturing site. On August 30, two defence logistics facilities in Poland were hit by separate arson attacks.
In September, German authorities arrested two Bulgarian nationals in Munich over allegations that they had thrown incendiary devices at Rohde & Schwarz, a company involved in defence electronics.
Taken individually, such incidents can resemble a collection of criminal cases. Viewed as part of the security environment McCallum described, they point towards a different problem: the exploitation of ordinary European infrastructure as a means of strategic pressure.
That is precisely what makes hybrid operations difficult for traditional security institutions. They sit between categories. An arson attack may be treated as a criminal investigation. A cyber intrusion may be handled by a company’s security team. A suspicious financial transaction may fall to regulators. An attack on a defence supplier may become an intelligence matter.
The adversary, meanwhile, has no obligation to respect those institutional boundaries.
The boardroom becomes part of the security apparatus
The most consequential part of McCallum’s warning is therefore not about MI5 itself.
It is about everyone else.
In 2001, critical national infrastructure was far more closely associated with the state. In 2026, much of the infrastructure on which national resilience depends is privately owned. Digital networks, logistics systems, research facilities and major elements of supply chains are controlled by companies and institutions whose primary responsibilities are commercial or academic.
That changes who has to make security decisions.
The next serious disruption may require action not only from intelligence officers and ministers, but from a chief executive deciding whether a supplier is trustworthy, a university restricting access to sensitive research, or an infrastructure operator determining whether its cyber defences are adequate.
The distinction between economic security and national security has consequently become increasingly difficult to maintain.
It also creates a political problem. Governments can demand resilience, but private organisations ultimately bear much of the cost. Security requirements mean investment in cyber protection, physical security, monitoring, compliance and contingency planning. Companies may also face greater insurance exposure and liability if critical operations are compromised.
For universities, the tension is even sharper. Research depends on international collaboration, foreign funding and the movement of knowledge across borders. A security model designed to protect sensitive technologies can simultaneously make the open academic environment on which innovation depends more difficult to sustain.
Britain is changing the rules
The UK has begun building a legal framework around this new reality.
The National Security (State Threats) Act 2026, enacted in July, gives the British authorities enhanced powers to designate foreign proxy networks as security threats, restrict foreign funding and strengthen protections around university research. The September UK-EU cyber sanctions package targeting Russian state cyber operations adds a coordinated European dimension.
Other measures point in the same direction. European governments have pursued diplomatic expulsions, closed Russian consular facilities and introduced visa restrictions targeting former Russian military personnel in response to infrastructure attacks. The European Parliament is also working on measures intended to strengthen sovereign cyber capabilities and protect vulnerable infrastructure including undersea cables, energy grids and port logistics.
These are not simply additions to counter-terrorism policy. They represent the construction of a broader security regime around economic and technological systems.
There is an obvious strategic rationale. Western governments cannot protect every factory, server, laboratory and supply chain through direct state control. They need the organisations that own those assets to become part of the defensive architecture.
But delegation also transfers risk.
Security becomes an economic burden
The beneficiaries of this transition are relatively easy to identify. Cybersecurity and defence-technology companies stand to gain from higher spending and new regulatory requirements. Intelligence agencies acquire broader responsibilities and, in some cases, stronger legal powers. Criminal networks operating as proxies for states gain a cheap mechanism for creating disruption while preserving a degree of deniability for their sponsors.
The costs are distributed much more widely.
Private infrastructure operators must defend assets that may have previously been regarded primarily as commercial property. Businesses face additional compliance obligations and higher operating costs. Universities must weigh openness against security controls. European markets face greater scrutiny of foreign investment, technology transfers, funding and movement across borders.
That creates a paradox at the centre of the new security model.
The open economic system that made Europe prosperous also creates many of the vulnerabilities that hostile states can exploit. Private ownership, international supply chains, academic cooperation and relatively frictionless movement are strengths in normal conditions. They can become attack surfaces in a confrontation conducted below the threshold of conventional war.
The answer cannot simply be to close those systems down. Yet the old assumption that commerce and security can operate in separate worlds is becoming harder to defend.
From emergency response to permanent resilience
McCallum’s warning effectively moves the starting point of national security down the chain of command.
The question is no longer only what governments should do when a crisis reaches COBRA or another emergency mechanism. It is what companies, universities and infrastructure operators should have done before the crisis became visible.
That is a profound change in the allocation of responsibility.
For a quarter of a century, the defining security lesson of September 11 was that governments had to become better at finding and destroying terrorist networks. The emerging lesson of 2026 is less centralised and more difficult to enforce: governments can no longer carry the burden alone.
The result is a form of national defence without a clearly defined frontline. A defence factory can be a military asset. A university laboratory can become a strategic vulnerability. A shipping route, cloud network or private logistics facility can acquire security significance without ever becoming part of the formal defence establishment.
The state still sets the rules and retains the most powerful intelligence capabilities. But an increasing share of the battlefield exists in places the state does not own.
That leaves Western governments facing an awkward question: how much of the openness they are trying to protect can survive once every private network, research partnership and supply chain has to be treated as part of the national security perimeter?
Read also:
- Twenty-five years after the September 11 attacks, the physical towers in New York have been replaced by light installations, but the security regime created in their wake remains solid concrete. For European citizens, 9/11 was not just an American tragedy - it was the catalyst that transformed EU airport screening, expanded state surveillance, and permanently redefined the boundaries between public safety and personal privacy.
Sources: Independent, Reuters, BBC The Telegraph, MCAC
