Germany’s BND Warns of Russian ‘Shadow War’: Why Berlin Is Rethinking Its Defense Strategy

Germany is already in a covert conflict with Russia that threatens to blur the line between peace and national defense, the head of the BND foreign intelligence service warned the Bundestag. From explosive-rigged drones at Leipzig airport to widespread sabotage, Moscow’s hybrid strategy is forcing Berlin to grant its intelligence agencies active intervention powers and shift national security obligations onto the private sector.
For Germany, the significance is larger than the individual incidents. The country has become one of the principal arteries through which European military and economic support reaches Ukraine. Disrupting that infrastructure offers Moscow a way to put pressure on Berlin without crossing the threshold of an overt military confrontation with NATO.
The war Germany was not planning to fight
Jäger’s most consequential warning was directed at a timeline that has shaped European defence planning: 2029, the year previously identified by NATO and German planners as a possible point by which Russia could rebuild sufficient conventional strength to challenge the alliance.
The BND chief effectively rejected the comfort provided by that horizon.
Germany may have until 2029 to prepare for a possible conventional confrontation, but the confrontation beneath that threshold is already under way. Sabotage, cyberattacks, hostile drones, false-flag activity and political interference do not require Russia to have rebuilt its conventional forces. They require something else: a willingness to accept risk and exploit the reluctance of democratic governments to respond to ambiguous acts of aggression.
That distinction matters.

The BND does not currently see intelligence indicating a full-scale Russian invasion of NATO territory. Jäger instead warned of “low-threshold military activities” and false-flag operations, particularly around the Baltic states. Cyber interference aimed at political processes, including Latvia’s parliamentary elections, belongs to the same strategic category.
The purpose is not necessarily to provoke a war. It is to create pressure without providing NATO with a clear moment at which collective military retaliation becomes unavoidable.
Russia’s calculation, as presented by the German intelligence services, is therefore less about defeating NATO militarily than about influencing the political decisions that sustain European resistance to the war in Ukraine.
Germany is the pressure point
Berlin’s importance to Moscow follows from the role Germany has assumed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Germany moved away from the caution associated with its traditional Ostpolitik and became Europe’s largest military donor and economic backer of Ukraine. That transformation made German political will a strategic asset for Kyiv - and a strategic obstacle for Moscow.
The logic behind targeting German logistics and defence infrastructure is straightforward. If support for Ukraine depends on the continued functioning of German railways, airports, energy systems, defence factories and transport networks, then those systems become part of the wider security contest.
The Leipzig/Halle incident illustrates the problem particularly well. An explosive-equipped drone near Ukrainian-bound cargo aircraft is not conventional warfare. Yet it is also difficult to treat such an incident as ordinary espionage when the apparent target is part of a military supply chain.
That is the grey zone Germany’s institutions are now being forced to confront.
The challenge for Moscow is to apply enough pressure to alter German behaviour while keeping each individual operation below the political threshold that would trigger a conventional response. For Berlin, the difficulty is almost the reverse: how to respond decisively without allowing an undeclared campaign to dictate the escalation ladder.
The state is changing its own rules
Germany’s response is beginning to move beyond intelligence collection.
The government is preparing legislation that would give the BND and BfV powers to conduct active countermeasures in exceptional circumstances. Under the proposed framework, agencies could move beyond collecting and analysing information to intervening against an ongoing cyberattack or disrupting physical sabotage directed at defence projects.
That would represent a significant change in the operating model of Germany’s intelligence services.
The traditional distinction between intelligence and defence becomes harder to maintain when the threat itself is deliberately designed to sit between the two. An agency that can identify an active cyberattack but is legally unable to stop it faces an obvious institutional contradiction. The same applies when intelligence services identify preparations for physical sabotage but cannot directly intervene to prevent the operation.
The proposed reform is an attempt to close that gap.
It also raises the question of how far Germany is prepared to move from the postwar model of intelligence restraint. The constitutional limits surrounding the country’s security institutions were built in response to the experience of dictatorship and state abuse. Expanding operational powers is therefore not simply a technical adjustment to a new threat.
It changes the balance between security and restraint.
That tension is likely to become more pronounced as Russian operations increasingly target civilian infrastructure rather than purely military facilities.
Civil defence becomes a private-sector responsibility
The other part of Berlin’s response is less dramatic but potentially more consequential.
The Interior Ministry is preparing a broader package covering drones, cyberattacks and infrastructure subversion. It would place direct physical and airspace security obligations on operators of critical infrastructure, energy companies and defence firms.
This shifts part of national security responsibility away from the state and towards the companies that operate the infrastructure on which the state depends.
An airport or energy company would no longer be simply a civilian operator exposed to a security threat. Its perimeter, airspace, digital networks and continuity of operations would become part of the national defence architecture.
That carries costs. Infrastructure operators face additional security requirements, investment in protection systems and greater legal exposure if those systems fail. The beneficiaries are likely to include security providers, anti-drone technology companies and specialist defence contractors.
But the bigger change is institutional.
Germany is being pushed towards a model in which national resilience cannot be separated from private infrastructure. The old assumption that the state protects the country while businesses maintain their own operations becomes increasingly difficult to sustain when those operations are themselves potential targets in a geopolitical conflict.
Moscow’s advantage lies below the threshold
The Baltic dimension makes the calculation clearer.
German intelligence sees no indication of a conventional Russian attack on NATO, but it is watching a combination of false-flag tactics, GPS interference, minor border provocations and political cyber operations. These activities create pressure without necessarily producing the kind of attack for which NATO has a straightforward military response.
That ambiguity is strategically useful.
Russia can test how quickly European governments react, how much disruption they tolerate and where their legal thresholds lie. It can also force NATO members to spend resources defending against a large number of relatively small incidents.
The cumulative effect may matter more than any single operation.
For Germany, the danger is that political leaders remain focused on the possibility of a future conventional war while the security environment changes underneath them. The 2029 planning horizon was designed around the question of when Russia might again possess the conventional capacity to threaten NATO. The intelligence warning on Monday was about a different question: how much damage can be done before that point without a conventional war ever beginning?
That is why the distinction between peace and conflict is becoming increasingly difficult to preserve.
Germany’s emerging response - broader infrastructure obligations, stronger counterintelligence powers, and a readiness posture that begins before conventional war - amounts to an institutional admission that the old categories no longer describe the threat.
The harder question is where the new boundary will be drawn once German agencies have the legal power to cross it themselves.
Sources: Welt, DIE ZEIT, Donaukurier
