UK and Germany deepen security ties as Europe confronts a permanent hybrid threat

The UK and Germany are creating a new partnership to counter sabotage, cyberattacks and hostile information operations, deepening cooperation between two of Europe's most important security powers as the continent adapts to a more dangerous and less predictable threat environment. The initiative is significant not simply because London and Berlin are agreeing to share more information, but because it reflects a broader change in European security thinking: attacks on infrastructure, digital systems and public information are increasingly being treated as part of the same strategic threat as conventional military aggression.

The partnership comes at a time when European governments are increasingly concerned about Russia's ability to operate below the threshold of open warfare. Sabotage, cyber operations, covert influence, the use of proxies and attempts to manipulate public debate allow hostile states to impose costs on European countries without necessarily triggering the kind of immediate military response that would follow a conventional attack. For governments across Europe, the challenge is therefore becoming less about responding to individual incidents and more about building systems capable of detecting and absorbing sustained hostile activity.

From individual incidents to a permanent threat

The UK government says the new partnership will improve cooperation between Britain and Germany in identifying, deterring and disrupting sabotage and cyberattacks. The two countries intend to strengthen the exchange of information and work more closely with organisations that could become targets, while Britain is also establishing a National Centre for Information Defence to address hostile information operations, including disinformation and deepfakes.

The broader significance is that London and Berlin are treating these activities as interconnected rather than as separate categories of crime or intelligence work. A cyberattack can be used to disrupt a physical system, while sabotage can be followed by an information campaign designed to create confusion about who was responsible. An attack on infrastructure can then generate economic losses and public anxiety that are amplified online. The effectiveness of hybrid warfare comes precisely from combining these different forms of pressure while keeping each individual action sufficiently ambiguous to complicate the response.

Russia has become the central concern behind this shift. European governments have repeatedly warned that Moscow is using a wider range of tools to weaken Western support for Ukraine, test the resilience of European societies and impose costs on countries that are backing Kyiv. The war therefore extends beyond the front line: European governments increasingly see their own territory, infrastructure and information space as part of the wider strategic environment.

Germany is confronting the vulnerabilities of Europe's largest economy

The issue is particularly important for Germany because of the country's central position in Europe's industrial and infrastructure networks. Germany is not only the EU's largest economy but also one of the continent's most important transport, manufacturing and energy hubs. Disruption to German infrastructure can therefore have consequences that extend well beyond the country's borders and affect European supply chains and economic activity.

Berlin has already been forced to reconsider several assumptions that shaped its security and economic policy for decades. The Russian invasion of Ukraine exposed the risks associated with energy dependence, while the broader deterioration in relations with Moscow has pushed Germany towards higher defence spending, greater military readiness and stronger protection of strategic infrastructure. Hybrid threats add another layer to this process because they target precisely the interconnected systems on which Germany's economic model depends.

The challenge is also institutional. Much of the infrastructure that could be targeted is privately owned or operated, while responsibility for national security remains with the state. Energy companies, telecommunications operators, transport firms and technology providers possess information that governments may need in order to identify an attack, but sharing that information requires permanent mechanisms of cooperation. This is why resilience is increasingly becoming a national-security issue rather than simply a matter of corporate risk management.

For Germany, the objective is consequently shifting from trying to prevent every possible incident towards ensuring that an attack cannot produce disproportionate consequences. Redundant systems, stronger cyber defences, alternative supply routes, faster recovery mechanisms and better intelligence-sharing all become part of the same security strategy.

Britain is returning to the centre of European security cooperation

For the UK, the partnership has a different but equally important dimension. Brexit removed Britain from the EU's political structures, but it did not change the country's geographical position or its strategic interests in Europe. Britain remains one of the continent's strongest military powers and has significant intelligence and cyber capabilities, making it difficult to build a credible European security system without British participation.

Germany is an especially important partner because of its economic weight and growing role in European defence. The two countries have been moving towards closer strategic cooperation since the signing of the Kensington Treaty, which established a broader framework for collaboration in defence, security, technology and economic resilience. The latest initiative suggests that this relationship is becoming more operational rather than remaining primarily political.

The arrangement also illustrates how European security is evolving after Brexit. Britain does not need to re-enter EU structures to become more deeply integrated into European defence cooperation. Instead, London can build bilateral relationships with key European powers and participate in wider NATO initiatives, creating a network of overlapping security arrangements. In practice, the European security architecture is becoming more flexible and more complicated, with NATO, the EU and individual national partnerships performing different functions.

That matters because many of the threats now facing Europe do not fit neatly into the responsibilities of a single institution. NATO is designed primarily around collective defence, while cyberattacks, infrastructure sabotage, foreign interference and information operations often require cooperation between intelligence agencies, police forces, governments and private companies.

Critical infrastructure is becoming part of Europe's defence perimeter

The growing emphasis on sabotage is changing the definition of what Europe needs to defend. Critical infrastructure used to be discussed mainly in terms of economic efficiency and continuity of public services. Increasingly, the same infrastructure is being viewed as a strategic asset whose disruption could affect national security.

Energy networks are an obvious example, but the vulnerability extends to telecommunications, ports, airports, railways, data centres, logistics systems and undersea cables. Modern European economies depend on these networks functioning continuously, and their interconnectedness means that disruption in one sector can quickly spread into others.

This creates a difficult problem for European governments. Protecting every individual asset is impossible, particularly when much of the infrastructure is operated by private companies and when attackers can constantly search for new vulnerabilities. The more realistic objective is to create systems that can withstand disruption and recover rapidly.

That approach changes the economics of infrastructure as well. European governments and companies may increasingly have to accept higher costs in exchange for redundancy and security. A cheaper network that depends on a single supplier or vulnerable digital system can become significantly more expensive once the potential cost of a major disruption is taken into account.

This is one reason why the concept of European strategic autonomy is expanding beyond defence manufacturing and energy security. Control over communications, data, digital infrastructure, supply chains and critical technologies is increasingly being treated as a component of national resilience.

The information environment is becoming another battlefield

The British decision to establish a National Centre for Information Defence also reflects a growing European concern about the information dimension of hybrid warfare. Hostile influence does not have to convince an entire population of a particular falsehood to be effective. It can be enough to create uncertainty, undermine confidence in government institutions or intensify existing political divisions.

Artificial intelligence makes this environment more difficult to manage. Deepfakes and other forms of synthetic content can be produced at a much lower cost than before and distributed rapidly through social media and other online networks. During a crisis, manipulated material can spread before authorities have established what happened, creating an information vacuum that hostile actors can exploit.

This makes information resilience increasingly important for national security. If an attack damages infrastructure, governments need to communicate quickly and credibly with the public. If a cyberattack disrupts services, citizens and businesses need reliable information about what is happening. If a foreign actor attempts to exploit the crisis, authorities need the capacity to identify and counter the operation.

The dividing line between cybersecurity and information security is therefore becoming less meaningful. Both involve protecting the ability of a society to trust and use the systems on which it depends.

Europe is moving from deterrence to resilience

The wider strategic change is that European governments can no longer rely entirely on traditional deterrence. During the Cold War, the central question was largely whether a military attack could be deterred through the threat of overwhelming retaliation. Hybrid operations create a different calculation because an adversary can attempt to impose costs while deliberately remaining below the threshold of conventional military conflict.

The response therefore has to include resilience as well as retaliation. If a cyberattack can be contained within hours, a damaged communications network restored quickly and an information campaign exposed before it gains traction, the strategic value of the attack is significantly reduced.

This does not mean that military deterrence becomes less important. On the contrary, Russia's war against Ukraine has reinforced the need for European countries to maintain credible conventional defence capabilities. But military power is increasingly only one layer of a much broader security system.

For European governments, resilience means being able to continue operating under pressure. It involves protecting infrastructure, securing supply chains, strengthening cyber capabilities, sharing intelligence and ensuring that public institutions can maintain credibility during a crisis. It also requires cooperation with companies whose networks and infrastructure are essential to national security.

A more interconnected European security architecture

The UK-German partnership is therefore part of a much larger transformation. NATO remains the foundation of European collective defence, but bilateral arrangements are becoming increasingly important for dealing with threats that require specialised intelligence, rapid coordination or close cooperation with private-sector operators.

Britain and Germany are particularly well placed to develop this model because they combine significant military capabilities with large economies and extensive intelligence and technological resources. Their cooperation can also serve as a bridge between the UK's security structures and continental Europe at a time when the threat environment is pushing countries closer together despite the political divisions created by Brexit.

Other European states are pursuing similar approaches, particularly those that have been exposed to Russian cyber operations, sabotage risks and information campaigns. The emerging pattern is not the creation of a single European security structure but a dense network of overlapping relationships that connect NATO, the EU and national governments.

That network is likely to become increasingly important as European countries prepare for a prolonged period of strategic confrontation with Russia. The most serious attacks may not always be spectacular. They may consist of repeated attempts to exploit small weaknesses across infrastructure, institutions and societies, gradually increasing the costs of maintaining support for Ukraine and undermining confidence in European governments.

Europe is preparing for security without a clear line between war and peace

The deeper message of the British-German agreement is that Europe is preparing for a security environment in which the distinction between war and peace becomes increasingly blurred. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the destructive potential of conventional military force, but the wider confrontation has also shown that states can compete through cyber operations, sabotage, economic pressure and information manipulation.

For Europe, this means that defence can no longer be confined to armies, weapons systems and national borders. The resilience of electricity networks, telecommunications, ports, digital infrastructure, supply chains and public institutions can be just as important in determining whether a hostile campaign succeeds.

The UK and Germany are responding by building mechanisms designed to detect and disrupt threats before they can generate wider consequences. Their partnership therefore represents more than another bilateral security agreement. It is part of Europe's gradual transition towards a model in which national security is defined by the ability of an entire society to withstand sustained pressure.

That transition will also carry economic and political costs. Greater resilience requires investment, redundancy and tighter controls over strategic technologies and infrastructure, while closer security cooperation may place new demands on private companies. But for European governments, the alternative is increasingly clear: an interconnected economy that is efficient in normal conditions but vulnerable to disruption can itself become a strategic liability.