The Juggernaut of No Return: How the Kremlin Is Conducting Covert Mobilization for the War Against Ukraine

To avoid another shock, the Kremlin developed and perfected a model of "silent" or "creeping" mobilization. Instead of one massive draft, a cynical, hybrid system was created, combining massive financial incentives, aggressive legal manipulation, bureaucratic pressure, and blackmail targeted at the most vulnerable social groups.

Money as the Main Pillar of Recruitment

Money has become the central pillar of the current recruitment system in Russia. The Kremlin has turned military service into the most lucrative business for residents of poor, provincial regions of the Russian Federation, where average monthly wages rarely exceed 30,000–40,000 rubles.

Over the past year, one-time payments for signing a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense reached historic highs. In many regions — including wealthier federal subjects like Moscow, the Moscow Region, or the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug — the total up-front payout just for signing a contract exceeds 2 million rubles, often equivalent to tens of thousands of dollars. On the front lines, soldiers receive between 200,000 and 300,000 rubles per month, which is several times the average salary in Russia. Furthermore, new legal regulations allow for the cancellation of credit and tax debts for individuals who choose to join the military.

For many families from the deep provinces, sending a father, husband, or son to the front line has become the only way to escape debt traps, purchase an apartment, or pay off a mortgage. In regime sociology, this phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the "deadly social elevator." For residents of small towns and villages in Siberia or the Far East, the military has ceased to be a duty and has instead become the sole opportunity to alter their fate — even if the price is the highest possible.

However, financial incentive alone is insufficient to cover the massive losses on the front line. For this reason, the Russian military and security services have implemented methods of direct pressure on select social groups with limited access to legal protection. The main sources of recruitment for the Kremlin include volunteers enticed by funds, immigrants and minorities, as well as prisoners and debtors.

Pressure on Labor Migrants

One of the primary targets of this cynical recruitment policy has been labor migrants from Central Asian countries, including Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, who are applying for Russian citizenship or have recently received it. Russian police and the National Guard (Rosgvardiya) regularly conduct raids at marketplaces, construction sites, mosques, and logistics centers. Men are threatened with immediate deportation, revocation of residence permits, or cancellation of their newly granted passports if they refuse to sign a military contract. On the flip side, expedited citizenship for entire families is offered in exchange for service on the front lines.

The Ministry of Defense has adopted and expanded schemas previously pioneered by the Wagner Group, turning recruitment in correctional facilities into a fully integrated state procedure. What's more, legislative amendments now allow for the freezing of criminal cases or complete exemption from criminal liability for suspects and defendants right at the investigation stage, provided they agree to deploy to the war zone.

Digital Control System

In addition to courting volunteers and coercing marginalized groups, the Kremlin has built an advanced digital control system over all citizens of draft age. The launch of the Electronic Draft Notice Registry completely changes the rules of the game in Russia. A military draft notice is deemed delivered the moment it is published on the state portal Gosuslugi (the digital public services platform), regardless of whether the citizen logged into their account or read it. The moment a draft notice is generated in the system, the individual is automatically barred from leaving the country.

If the draftee fails to report to the enlistment office within 20 days, severe legal sanctions are triggered, including bans on driving vehicles, registering real estate or cars, securing loans and mortgages, and running a business. This system makes evading service extraordinarily difficult, closing a digital prison around the citizen without needing to send police officers to their front door.

While the silent mobilization policy allows Putin to avoid mass political protests, it inflicts immense costs on the Russian economy. Industry and construction face a critical labor shortage as hundreds of thousands of men have departed for the front line or fled abroad. Agriculture sees shortages of drivers, machine operators, and seasonal workers. The IT and innovation sectors have been hit by a brain drain and a decline in technological potential due to the flight of specialists. Meanwhile, public finances bear a heavy strain as regional budgets struggle with ever-rising mobilization payouts.

Economic Consequences of Silent Mobilization

Competition for workers among the defense industry, the military, and civilian enterprises has driven unemployment to record lows and fueled a wage-price spiral. To retain staff, civilian companies must drastically raise salaries, which fuels severe inflation and forces the Central Bank of Russia to keep interest rates at extremely high levels. The state is effectively competing with its own labor market: while the market offers jobs for economic development, the state pays millions for people to go to their deaths.

A Major Post-Election Draft in the Works?

Internal Russian documents indicate that the country is preparing for a new mobilization effort, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported shortly after receiving a briefing from the head of Military Intelligence (HUR). Zelenskyy noted that this is slated to take place immediately following the parliamentary elections scheduled for September 18–20. He stated that after the elections, Putin plans to carry out a rapid, additional mobilization of several hundred thousand Russians by the end of the year, with another mobilization on a similar scale planned for the following year.

For now, a recruitment model built on massive payouts, digital surveillance, and the exploitation of the vulnerable allows the Kremlin to sustain the pace of military operations and continually replace front-line losses. However, it is a strategy akin to a serpent eating its own tail.