Squeezing Out Starlink: How the EU Plans to Take Control of Satellite-to-Mobile Spectrum

Unlike conventional satellite broadband, which requires a dedicated terminal, direct-to-device technology allows standard smartphones to connect directly to satellites. This shift has transformed the 2GHz spectrum into a crucial battleground, where political ambitions and commercial self-interest now overlap. Europe no longer wants to leave the future of such critical infrastructure entirely to an American provider whose network has become strategically vital far beyond the consumer market.

The strategic value of a frequency allocation

The 2027 spectrum decision may appear technical, but it could shape the competitive landscape for years. Radio frequencies are a finite resource, and access to the right bands can determine which services operators can develop, where they can operate and how quickly they can reach customers.

The European Commission is examining an allocation procedure that could reserve portions of the 2GHz band for European operators while imposing higher barriers on non-European competitors. Amendments filed by European Parliament lead negotiator Angelika Winzig and centrist lawmaker Michał Kobosko seek to strengthen restrictions on foreign companies seeking access to strategic airwaves.

The distinction matters. Europe is not simply trying to build another satellite network. It is considering whether market access to a critical communications resource should depend partly on the identity and strategic interests of the operator.

For established European telecom companies, a collective approach could offer greater bargaining power and a route into a market that might otherwise be difficult to enter independently. Satellite connectivity requires substantial investment and coordination, while established terrestrial operators already have relationships with millions of customers. An alliance could combine those commercial advantages with access to space-based infrastructure.

Yet the proposed arrangement also serves a defensive purpose. Direct-to-device services could allow satellite operators to reach mobile users without relying on the conventional infrastructure of terrestrial telecom companies in the same way as existing services. The technology therefore threatens to redraw the boundaries of the telecommunications market.

European incumbents have an incentive to secure a position before those boundaries change. Governments, meanwhile, have reasons to ensure that the resulting infrastructure remains within reach of European political and regulatory authority.

That overlap between commercial self-interest and strategic policy is central to the dispute.

Ukraine has made dependence harder to ignore

Europe's concern about Starlink cannot be separated from the experience of Ukraine, where satellite communications have proved vital during the war against Russia. The network has helped sustain connectivity under conditions in which conventional infrastructure is vulnerable, demonstrating the operational value of rapidly deployable satellite services.

But the same experience has exposed the risks of dependence on infrastructure controlled by a single private company.

A communications network can become strategically indispensable without being publicly owned or subject to direct government control. Decisions by a commercial provider can consequently have implications that extend beyond its customers and shareholders. For governments relying on that provider, the distinction between purchasing a service and depending on an external actor becomes increasingly difficult to maintain.

The vulnerability is not limited to military communications. Emergency services, businesses and civilians may also need connectivity when terrestrial networks fail. Space-based infrastructure can provide resilience, but that resilience is less reassuring if access ultimately depends on decisions made outside the jurisdiction of the users.

SpaceX has invoked precisely this concern in its opposition to the European proposals. In a four-page submission, the company warned that the EU's approach could deprive Europeans of reliable direct-to-device services and create interference problems worldwide, including for emergency services in Ukraine.

Those warnings should not be dismissed simply because they come from a company facing regulatory restrictions. Interference and service availability are legitimate considerations in spectrum policy. Equally, a provider's commercial argument against restrictions does not resolve the strategic question of whether Europe should accept long-term dependence on a single foreign network.

The war has made that question considerably more urgent. It has shown both the advantages of commercial satellite infrastructure and the limitations of treating access to it as an ordinary market transaction.

Starlink is selling indispensability, not just connectivity

SpaceX has spent the past two years lobbying in Brussels against measures that could constrain its access to European markets. Its strategy also extends beyond regulatory arguments.

During wildfires in France and Spain, Starlink offered terminal activation and communications support. French authorities declined the assistance, citing the absence of widespread telecommunications damage caused by the fires.

Such interventions can serve a commercial purpose beyond the immediate deployment of equipment. By offering connectivity during crises, a company can establish itself as a practical solution when conventional systems come under pressure. The provider becomes associated with speed, availability and the ability to act when public infrastructure struggles.

Célestine Rabouam of the French Institute of Geopolitics (GEODE) has described Starlink's positioning in terms of indispensability rather than dominance alone. That distinction helps explain why the European response is becoming political.

Market dominance can be challenged through competition, investment, and alternative products. Indispensability is more difficult to address because the network may already be embedded in the contingency planning of governments and emergency services. Restricting access without a credible replacement can create vulnerabilities of its own.

This is the dilemma facing Brussels. Europe wants to reduce its exposure to a foreign provider, but the provider's existing capabilities are part of what makes that exposure difficult to unwind.

Sovereignty is easier to declare than to deliver

Europe is developing alternatives, but the timelines underline the scale of the challenge. The IRIS² secure connectivity constellation, led by the SpaceRISE consortium, is scheduled for initial launches in 2029, with full capacity targeted for 2032. Existing commercial infrastructure includes Eutelsat OneWeb, while national military systems such as France's Syracuse IV provide additional capabilities.

These assets give Europe a foundation on which to build a more diversified satellite communications architecture. They do not, by themselves, establish that a European alternative can match Starlink's scale, availability or pace of deployment across every relevant service.

The gap between political ambition and operational capability matters particularly in direct-to-device connectivity. Reserving spectrum may improve the prospects of European operators, but it cannot automatically create competitive services. Those will depend on infrastructure, investment, technical execution, and the ability to make connectivity attractive to customers.

Nor is it clear that a European alliance would eliminate dependence. A regional consortium could create its own concentrations of market power, particularly if regulatory advantages insulate its members from outside competition. Sovereignty at the European level is not synonymous with competition at the consumer level.

The EU therefore faces two distinct tasks: reducing strategic dependence and building a market capable of delivering reliable services. Treating the first as sufficient could undermine the second.

IRIS² is an important part of the longer-term answer, but its deployment schedule leaves a period in which European ambitions must coexist with existing commercial networks. The 2027 spectrum decision will shape that transition before the European constellation reaches full capacity.

The cost of protection

For European telecom operators and the aerospace industry, the emerging policy offers substantial opportunities. A more favourable regulatory framework could help established carriers enter the satellite market, while companies involved in European space infrastructure could benefit from greater institutional backing and longer-term demand.

For consumers, the immediate effects are less certain.

Restricting foreign access could delay the introduction of some direct-to-device services or reduce competitive pressure on prices. European providers may need time to develop comparable capabilities, and a protected market does not guarantee that customers will receive the most advanced or affordable products.

The opposite risk is also real. Allowing a dominant foreign provider unrestricted access could leave Europe with limited leverage over infrastructure that becomes essential to communications resilience. In that scenario, consumers might enjoy rapid access to new services while governments retain fewer options if the relationship with the provider deteriorates.

Brussels is attempting to manage both risks through regulation, industrial policy and investment in sovereign alternatives. The danger is that the balance shifts too far towards protecting incumbent companies rather than creating genuinely resilient infrastructure.

The 2GHz allocation will not settle Europe's wider relationship with SpaceX, nor will it determine the future of satellite communications on its own. It will, however, establish an important precedent for how the EU intends to govern strategic infrastructure when commercial power and public interests no longer align neatly.