Russia’s ‘Starlink Alternative’ Fails as Two More Rassvet Satellites Fall From Orbit

The satellites, designated No. 17 and No. 23, are expected to burn up in the atmosphere on 1 November and 29 October 2026 respectively, according to orbital projections. Both are descending by approximately 1.6–1.7 kilometres a day. Without successful propulsion manoeuvres to restore their altitude, their remaining time in orbit is limited.

The problem is becoming a pattern

The July failures are not isolated incidents in an otherwise mature programme. They follow the loss of another Rassvet spacecraft, satellite No. 4, which suffered a propulsion failure after the first production batch was launched in March and burned up in June.

Industry reports also indicated in late August that several satellites from the July launch had struggled to raise their orbits. The latest developments therefore point to a recurring weakness in the constellation’s early deployment, although the available information does not establish the precise technical cause of each failure.

That distinction matters. A satellite can fail for several reasons, including propulsion, control-system or other hardware problems. The fact that spacecraft have repeatedly failed to complete orbit-raising manoeuvres identifies a serious operational problem, but it does not by itself prove that a single defective component or manufacturing process is responsible.

For Bureau 1440, the challenge is not simply to put satellites into space. It is to ensure that they reach the correct orbits, remain operational and perform consistently across successive production batches.

Low-Earth-orbit networks depend on this distinction between launching hardware and delivering usable infrastructure. A spacecraft that reaches orbit but cannot manoeuvre into its intended position may contribute little to the service the network is designed to provide. When such failures recur, the cost extends beyond the lost satellite to replacement manufacturing, launch capacity and pressure on the deployment schedule.

A 2027 deadline built around a much larger network

Rassvet’s official targets leave little room for a prolonged engineering learning curve. The programme aims to have 288 operational satellites available for the launch of commercial services by 2027, with the total constellation expected to reach 292 spacecraft by 2030.

So far, Russia has launched 38 satellites associated with the project: six experimental precursors and two production batches of 16 spacecraft each. Approximately 35 remain in orbit, although their presence there does not mean they are all operational or ready to provide commercial communications. Some occupy intermediate altitudes ranging from around 253 kilometres to more than 510 kilometres.

The arithmetic is demanding. The programme must move from an early deployment phase marked by propulsion failures and uneven orbital positioning to a substantially larger, functioning network in a relatively short period.

The loss of three spacecraft out of 32 production satellites launched in the March and July batches represents a measurable attrition problem. Yet the number alone understates the difficulty: a network’s value depends on the availability and distribution of functioning satellites, not simply the total number launched.

Nor does the failure of two spacecraft automatically make the 2027 target impossible. The briefing provides no confirmed production rate, replacement schedule or detailed deployment plan from which to calculate a definitive delay. What it does establish is that the existing timetable must accommodate recurring failures before the constellation has reached anything close to its intended scale.

Every replacement satellite would have to pass through the same production, launch and commissioning process. If the underlying reliability problem remains unresolved, adding more launches could increase the number of spacecraft in orbit without delivering a proportional increase in usable capacity.

Sovereignty is expensive when the hardware does not cooperate

The scale of the financial commitment makes the engineering difficulties more consequential. Rassvet is integrated into Russia’s federal Data Economy national project, with planned funding of approximately 102.8 billion roubles from the federal budget and 329 billion roubles in private corporate investment. Total estimated costs range from roughly 431.8 billion to 445 billion roubles.

These figures reflect a strategic ambition extending beyond an ordinary commercial telecommunications venture. Russia wants control over critical communications infrastructure rather than continued dependence on foreign systems that may be unavailable for political or military reasons.

That objective has gained particular importance since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the restrictions affecting Russian forces’ access to Western commercial communications equipment, including Starlink terminals.

But sovereign infrastructure is not necessarily independent in practice merely because it is domestically owned. Its reliability depends on the ability to manufacture complex components, integrate them into functioning systems and reproduce successful results at scale.

Sanctions and restrictions on access to foreign technology form part of the programme’s wider industrial environment. The briefing identifies domestic microelectronics and propulsion as areas of technological vulnerability, but does not establish that sanctions directly caused the latest satellite failures. It would be premature to attribute each malfunction to a particular supply-chain constraint.

The broader economic problem is clearer. When a strategic project has fixed political deadlines, technical setbacks create pressure for additional production, replacement launches and potentially more spending. Unless reliability improves, those costs risk growing alongside the constellation rather than disappearing as the network expands.

For Bureau 1440 and its parent company, ICS Holding, the central task is therefore not simply to manufacture more satellites. It is to establish a production process capable of delivering dependable spacecraft repeatedly enough to make the investment worthwhile.

A successful demonstration is not yet a communications network

Rassvet has demonstrated that the programme can achieve useful results. On 7 October, Bureau 1440 conducted a public five-minute video call between Adygea and Moscow using the system.

That test is relevant evidence of progress. It is not evidence that Russia already possesses a network capable of matching established satellite internet providers in coverage, capacity or resilience.

The distinction between demonstrating a service and sustaining it at scale is particularly important for low-Earth-orbit constellations. A successful connection proves that a particular configuration can work under the conditions of the test. Commercial deployment requires a sufficiently large and reliable network to provide service consistently, despite individual satellite failures and the demands of a much broader user base.

SpaceX’s Starlink illustrates the competitive challenge. Its established operational network gives it a scale advantage that a constellation still working through early production problems cannot quickly reproduce. Rassvet must overcome both the immediate engineering difficulties and the cumulative challenge of building a dense network with enough functioning spacecraft to support dependable communications.

Russia’s ambitions are not unusual in themselves. Governments increasingly view satellite communications as strategic infrastructure, particularly where terrestrial networks are vulnerable or foreign providers can restrict access. The difficulty lies in translating that strategic requirement into an operational system.

Rassvet’s current position is therefore more complicated than either a straightforward failure or a technological breakthrough. The programme has demonstrated connectivity and continued launching satellites, but its early losses raise doubts about whether deployment can proceed at the pace promised.

The military requirement is more urgent than the commercial timetable

The programme’s strategic significance is not confined to civilian broadband. Ukrainian military intelligence has monitored Rassvet’s deployment and warned of its potential future applications in reconnaissance data transmission, drone coordination and tactical military communications over Ukrainian territory.

The network could eventually give Russian forces another communications channel, reducing dependence on services controlled by Western companies. But potential military utility should not be confused with present battlefield capability.

Analysts cited in the briefing assess the constellation’s current density as insufficient to provide a reliable, large-scale combat substitute for Western systems such as Starlink. The distinction is crucial: a limited demonstration of connectivity does not establish the capacity to support sustained military operations across a broad area.

Nor do the latest failures mean that Rassvet has no military value. A developing network can provide useful capabilities before it reaches full scale. The question is whether those capabilities are sufficiently reliable and widely available for the tasks Russian forces might require.

This creates a tension between the programme’s strategic urgency and its engineering maturity. The more important satellite communications become to military planning, the greater the pressure to accelerate deployment. Yet speed cannot compensate indefinitely for spacecraft that fail to reach their intended orbits.

The Russian state must also weigh the allocation of funding between competing priorities. The briefing provides no evidence of a specific response by officials to the latest failures, nor does it establish that contracts or procurement decisions have already changed. Nevertheless, recurring technical problems create an obvious institutional challenge: whether to maintain the original timetable, invest more heavily in reliability or accept a slower path towards operational capability.

For a project backed by hundreds of billions of roubles, that choice is about more than the fortunes of a private aerospace contractor. It concerns the credibility of Russia’s wider effort to replace foreign technology with nationally controlled systems.