Russia Is Turning the Balkans Into a Hub for Europe’s Far-Right Networks

Russian far-right organisations are increasingly building ties with Serbian nationalist groups, turning longstanding ideological affinity into a cross-border political network. An investigation by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty traces links between the Russian movement known as RUSOV and the Serbian organisation Serbian Falcons. Some of these connections go beyond political meetings and shared ideology, extending into Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The story matters beyond Russian-Serbian relations. Moscow has spent years using the Balkans as an environment for spreading anti-Western narratives, but far-right organisations provide a separate channel for influence. Through personal networks, joint events, paramilitary structures and ideological links, Russian and European extremists can cooperate without being part of any formal alliance.

Old Connections Are Taking on a New Role

Contacts between Russian and Serbian radicals predate Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine by decades. Russian volunteers fought alongside Serbian forces during the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, while Serbian nationalist circles maintained relationships with Russian far-right and veterans’ organisations. Those networks did not disappear when the wars ended. Instead, they provided a foundation for new forms of cooperation.

A shared hostility towards the Western political model became one of the main connecting forces. Serbian far-right groups have often portrayed Russia as a counterweight to NATO and the EU and as Serbia’s most important international ally on the Kosovo issue. Russian radicals, meanwhile, have used the Serbian cause to promote their own vision of a struggle between “traditional nations” and the West.

That is why the relationship survived changing political circumstances. After 2022, it did not disappear but acquired a new dimension, centred on support for Russia’s war and mobilisation around anti-Western ideology.

RUSOV Is Building Beyond Russia

RUSOV is one example of how Russia’s far-right is attempting to establish international connections. The movement relies heavily on Slavic and Orthodox rhetoric, portraying Russia as the centre of a wider civilisation supposedly confronting a liberal West.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty traced contacts between RUSOV leader Andrey Rodionov and Serbian radicals. One particularly revealing photograph shows Rodionov alongside armed men against a backdrop featuring the flags of RUSOV and the Serbian Falcons. The location was identified as Ukraine’s Donetsk region. The episode suggests that cooperation between Russian and Serbian far-right activists can extend beyond political solidarity and into the context of the war itself.

Ideologically, the relationship is built around concepts such as Slavic unity, Orthodox Christianity, traditional values and opposition to NATO. This language allows radical groups from different countries to present their own political struggles as part of a single confrontation with the West.

Belgrade Is Becoming a Meeting Point for European Radicals

In 2026, the network gained another dimension. On 31 May, Belgrade hosted a conference titled “The Future of European Nations”, bringing together representatives of far-right and neo-fascist movements from several European countries.

The event was significant because it extended beyond Serbia’s domestic far-right scene. Participants included representatives of radical organisations from Italy, Spain and Greece. Some had previously attended events in Russia organised by figures connected to the Russian far-right.

The Belgrade gathering was organised by Serbian far-right politician Miša Vacić, who has been sanctioned by the United States over activities linked to Russian influence. The event demonstrated that the Balkans can serve as a meeting point between different parts of Europe’s far-right political landscape.

The importance of Belgrade therefore goes beyond Serbian politics. It provides a physical space where movements from different countries can establish contacts, exchange narratives and build relationships that are difficult to capture through conventional state-to-state diplomacy.

Orthodoxy Is Becoming a Political Instrument

One of the central elements of this network is the political use of Orthodox identity. For Russian far-right groups, Orthodox Christianity helps construct the idea of a common civilisational space encompassing Russia, Serbia and other Orthodox societies.

Within this framework, Russia’s war against Ukraine is presented not as an interstate conflict but as part of a broader struggle between “traditional” societies and the West. This framing gives political meaning to the presence of Serbian radicals in Russia’s broader ideological and military environment.

The rhetoric has particular resonance in the Balkans, where religion, national identity and territorial disputes have remained politically sensitive for decades. Russian far-right activists can draw on familiar regional grievances and incorporate them into a broader anti-Western narrative.

The result is a political language that links very different conflicts. Kosovo, NATO, Western influence and the war in Ukraine are presented as parts of the same confrontation.

From Political Contacts to Military Experience

The most sensitive aspect of this cooperation is its connection to paramilitary activity. Serbian volunteers have previously fought alongside Russian-backed forces in eastern Ukraine since 2014. Combat experience creates another layer of interaction between radical groups — one that goes beyond ideology and into practical networks.

This is particularly relevant in the case of RUSOV, which presents itself as part of Russia’s nationalist and paramilitary environment. Its contacts with Serbian radicals therefore potentially create channels for the exchange of personal connections, military experience and political symbolism built around war.

This is where ordinary international far-right solidarity can become a more serious security concern. Individual organisations may be small and politically marginal, but their members can possess combat experience, international connections and the ability to mobilise supporters around radical ideology.

Moscow Gains a Network Without a Formal Alliance

Russian influence in the Balkans does not operate exclusively through governments, diplomacy or media. Far-right organisations provide an alternative infrastructure that can operate outside official diplomatic channels.

Its value for Moscow lies precisely in its informal character. The Kremlin does not necessarily need to control every organisation or individual activist. Shared political narratives can be enough: anti-Americanism, opposition to NATO, hostility towards liberal democracy and support for Russia’s foreign-policy agenda.

The result is a network whose members may have different local objectives while converging on key geopolitical questions. Serbian radicals gain support for their own interpretation of the Balkans and Kosovo. Russian far-right activists gain European partners who can reinforce and legitimise their narratives outside Russia.

This creates influence that is difficult to measure through traditional indicators. It is not necessarily expressed through formal agreements or large organisations. It operates through people, meetings, symbols, ideological exchanges and accumulated personal relationships.

The Balkans Are Becoming Part of a Wider European Process

The most important development is that Russian-Serbian far-right cooperation can no longer be viewed simply as a bilateral phenomenon. The 2026 meetings in Belgrade, RUSOV’s links with Serbian and Bosnian radicals, and the involvement of individual activists in the war point towards a broader European network.

The Balkans can function as a junction connecting Russia’s far-right, Serbian nationalism and radical organisations elsewhere in Europe. This does not mean that all of these groups form a single centrally controlled structure or operate according to one plan. Their strength lies precisely in the network itself — shared events, personal relationships, ideological affinity and military experience.

For Europe, this creates a distinct security challenge. Far-right organisations may remain politically marginal, but they can cross borders quickly, exploit unresolved Balkan conflicts for mobilisation and transmit Russian narratives into European political environments.

The Balkans are therefore becoming more than a peripheral theatre of Russian influence. They are emerging as one of the places where Russia’s state-backed geopolitical agenda and non-state radical networks can intersect.