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From Political Friction to Street Hostility: The Growing Security Risk for Ukrainians in Poland

Elise Aranda
Posted September 14, 2026 · 11 views
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From Political Friction to Street Hostility: The Growing Security Risk for Ukrainians in Poland
Editorial Collage

As anti-Ukrainian political rhetoric and online polarization intensify in 2026, social friction in Poland is increasingly spilling onto the streets. Official police data from the first half of the year points to a rising trajectory in hate-motivated incidents, revealing how domestic political shifts and historical disputes are beginning to erode everyday security for nearly a million refugees.

The more important change is not the projection itself. It is the environment in which individual incidents are taking place.

Poland remains home to more than 960,000 Ukrainians under temporary protection. Their presence has become deeply embedded in Polish society — and increasingly entangled with arguments about welfare, jobs, housing, public services, taxation and the future of support for Ukraine. A dispute that once belonged largely to foreign policy has become a domestic political fault line.

That does not mean Poland has suddenly become hostile to Ukrainians as a whole. It does mean that the political cost of anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has fallen, while the risks for a highly visible minority appear to be rising.

The numbers need to be read carefully

The headline statistics are significant, but they are easy to misrepresent.

Polish police figures include not only physical violence but threats, insults, hate speech, harassment, damage to property and other offences in which investigators identify a national or ethnic motive. The 180 reports recorded between January and June therefore cannot be described as 180 assaults.

There is nevertheless evidence that physical aggression has increased over a longer period. The number of attacks against Ukrainians resulting in minor or moderately serious injuries rose from 142 in 2022 to 204 in 2024.

Recent reports have included street assaults, attacks on teenagers, verbal abuse over speaking Ukrainian, damaged or shot-at windows and incidents in public places and on transport. In one Warsaw case reported in September, a Polish citizen allegedly struck a Ukrainian man without an obvious reason, leaving him unconscious. Another reported case involved a 15-year-old Ukrainian who was beaten at a bathing complex in Łódź.

Such cases should not automatically be classified as hate crimes. Nationality is not, by itself, evidence of motive. Police, prosecutors and courts ultimately determine how an offence is qualified.

That distinction matters because there is a risk of turning a worrying trend into an exaggerated one. The available data point to a deteriorating security and social environment, not to a wave of violence sweeping every Polish city.

A political argument has become a social one

The shift is visible in public opinion.

In July, a CBOS poll found that 52 per cent of respondents opposed accepting further Ukrainian refugees, while 42 per cent supported it. In 2022, support for accepting refugees stood at 94 per cent.

That reversal is striking not simply because attitudes have changed, but because the refugee question is now part of a much wider domestic political contest.

Ukrainians are increasingly discussed through the language of competition: competition for jobs, housing, medical treatment, education and state assistance. Political actors and right-wing groups have promoted claims that Ukrainians receive preferential treatment or impose an excessive burden on Poland.

Those arguments do not automatically produce violence. Most people who oppose refugee policy will never attack a Ukrainian. But political rhetoric changes the context in which everyday confrontations occur. A group repeatedly portrayed as privileged, burdensome or responsible for economic difficulties can become an easier target for resentment.

The deterioration in attitudes towards Ukraine itself adds another layer.

According to CBOS, 46 per cent of Poles now view Polish-Ukrainian relations negatively, while only 12 per cent assess them positively. Disputes over the Volhynia tragedy and exhumations, historical policy, trade and grain have increasingly entered domestic political debate.

For an individual aggressor, those disputes may have nothing to do with a particular incident. They nevertheless contribute to a broader political vocabulary in which hostility towards Ukrainians has become more publicly available.

The street is where online politics becomes harder to contain

The most difficult part of the picture is the relationship between political rhetoric and the information environment.

Analysis of Polish-language social media cited by Balkan Insight found a 171 per cent increase in posts containing extreme anti-Ukrainian rhetoric between May 26 and July 13, 2026. Engagement with that material rose by 345 per cent.

There is no basis for treating those figures as evidence that online comments directly cause individual assaults. The connection is more indirect — and potentially more consequential.

Claims that Ukrainians are taking Polish jobs, receiving more support than Polish citizens, damaging the economy or dragging Poland into war have circulated as recurring themes. Polish and international experts have linked part of this online hostility to Russian disinformation operations.

The significance lies less in any individual false claim than in repetition. When political grievances, economic frustrations and disinformation converge around a single national group, hostility can become normalised without requiring an organised campaign of physical violence.

The online environment can lower the threshold of what people regard as acceptable to say. In some cases, that may also lower the threshold for confrontation in public.

Poland’s relationship with Ukraine is entering a different phase

The changing atmosphere is taking place against a fundamental structural reality: Poland and Ukraine remain closely connected, while the political relationship between them has become considerably more complicated.

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians live in Poland. Their economic and social presence is no longer temporary in practical terms, even though many remain covered by temporary protection. Meanwhile, Warsaw continues to confront the political consequences of its support for Ukraine and of the war next door.

That creates a tension which cannot easily be resolved by either side.

For Ukraine, Poland is a crucial neighbour and one of the largest destinations for people displaced by the war. For Polish politicians, the costs and benefits of that relationship are increasingly judged through domestic politics. Issues that might once have been treated primarily as matters of solidarity or bilateral diplomacy are now also campaign material.

The danger is that a political dispute between states can become a social dispute between populations.

That is particularly visible when language itself becomes a trigger for abuse. A person speaking Ukrainian in a street, on public transport or in another shared space is no longer merely expressing an identity; in a more polarised environment, that identity can become the basis for confrontation.

A warning sign, not a picture of Poland

The statistics also have another limitation. Rising reports do not necessarily mean that the underlying number of incidents has risen by exactly the same proportion.

More Ukrainians may be willing to report offences. Police registration may have improved. Rights groups may be more active. Media attention may encourage victims to come forward. A broader understanding of hate-related incidents can also affect the figures.

For that reason, the increase from 2025 to the first half of 2026 should not be presented as proof that physical attacks have risen by 30 per cent. It is evidence of an increase in registered prejudice-related incidents.

That distinction does not make the trend less politically relevant.

A country can remain broadly safe for a large migrant population while simultaneously experiencing a meaningful rise in targeted hostility. The two facts are not contradictory. Most Ukrainians in Poland are not victims of violence; that does not make a growing number of hate-motivated incidents insignificant.

The more consequential question is what happens when political polarisation, deteriorating bilateral sentiment and an increasingly aggressive online information environment reinforce one another.

For Poland, the issue is no longer simply how to manage a large refugee population. It is how to prevent a dispute over migration, Ukraine policy and national history from becoming a permanent source of social antagonism.

That is a much harder problem to police, because by the time hostility reaches the street, much of the political work of making it possible may already have happened elsewhere.

Sources: Polsat News, NFP, Anadolu Report, WeKnow24.

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