From Croatia to the UK: Why Europe’s Wildfire Crisis Is Outrunning Its Disaster Response

At least one person died. About 40 people were hospitalised, with between seven and 10 reported to be in critical condition or intensive care.

More than 300 firefighters, backed by the Croatian military, Coast Guard and volunteer units, were deployed. Yet the intensity of the fire was such that crews were periodically forced to retreat. More than 300 people were evacuated by boat from seaside areas, while total evacuations from Omiš and neighbouring settlements reached between 1,200 and 2,000 people.

That is the crucial fact about Omiš. The emergency was not simply large. It was fast.

When the fire outruns the response

Omiš is particularly exposed to a disaster of this kind. The permanent population is around 15,000, but the August holiday season brings more than 12,000 additional tourists a day. The town sits between steep limestone terrain, dense pine forests and the coast, with a narrow road corridor carrying both residents and visitors.

Under normal circumstances, that geography is an asset to tourism. During a rapidly advancing fire, it becomes a logistical trap.

The evacuation itself shows both the capacity and the limits of Croatia's emergency system. Thousands were moved to safety, emergency shelters were opened in Omiš, Split, Makarska and Dugi Rat, and maritime evacuation provided an escape route when roads became dangerous. Foreign tourists from countries including Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic were among those evacuated.

But the fact that people had to abandon vehicles in the fire zone or jump into the sea to escape the heat illustrates how quickly conventional evacuation assumptions can collapse.

The Croatian authorities succeeded in preventing a far greater loss of life, as Prime Minister Andrej Plenković noted after surveying the damage. Yet the operation also depended on assets beyond ordinary municipal firefighting: military support, the Coast Guard, fishing vessels and a large mobilisation of professional and volunteer firefighters.

That is an increasingly important distinction.

A system designed around containing a fire from the ground is poorly matched to a fire that can cross several kilometres in a few hours.

The Mediterranean is no longer the whole story

Omiš would be easier to treat as an exceptional event if Europe were not experiencing severe fires simultaneously.

In Greece, hundreds of people were evacuated by sea from resort areas in Chalkidiki, with firefighters supported by aircraft and helicopters. France evacuated hundreds from Luglon in the Landes. A 31,000-hectare fire in Huelva forced evacuations in Spain. Germany evacuated more than 2,000 people near Gey, while Britain recorded record wildfire occurrences for a second consecutive year.

The geography matters. Wildfire risk is appearing across a much broader European area rather than remaining a problem confined to the Mediterranean's hottest regions.

The EU's Copernicus Climate Change Service had warned of very extreme wildfire danger across large parts of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe through August 19. Western European average highs in mid-August reached 31.2°C, around 8°C above the 1961–1990 historical average, while continental averages were 1.6°C above historical levels.

The combination matters more than any individual number. Heat dries vegetation. Drought turns forests and grasslands into available fuel. Strong winds can then transform a contained fire into a rapidly advancing firestorm.

That is the environment in which traditional emergency planning is being tested.

Europe is running short of firefighting capacity

The pressure is visible in the resources already being consumed.

Spanish firefighting aircraft had logged more than 8,200 flight hours by mid-August, already exceeding the total recorded during the previous year's record-breaking season. That is not merely a measure of how busy one country's fleet has become. It points to a wider problem when several European countries are fighting serious fires at the same time.

National systems are designed to mobilise additional capacity when a crisis exceeds local resources. But simultaneous emergencies reduce the ability to rely on that spare capacity.

Volunteer firefighters face longer and more dangerous seasons. Professional crews face repeated deployments and greater physical risk. Aircraft and other specialised equipment accumulate operational hours faster. The problem is compounded when emergencies last for weeks rather than days.

Europe therefore faces a civil-protection problem that cannot be solved simply by adding more firefighters to individual municipalities.

The logical direction is towards a more integrated system in which aerial firefighting, maritime evacuation, military assistance, satellite intelligence and emergency communications can be coordinated across borders before national resources become exhausted.

Copernicus services are becoming more important in precisely this environment. Monitoring where the danger is greatest is no longer merely an analytical exercise when several countries may need emergency resources simultaneously. Environmental intelligence becomes part of operational command.

Tourism carries a new form of climate risk

For Omiš and other Mediterranean resorts, the consequences extend well beyond the cost of rebuilding burned properties.

Summer tourism depends on concentration. Thousands of people arrive in the same places at the same time, placing exceptional demands on roads, accommodation, electricity, water and emergency services. That model works efficiently when weather conditions remain within expected boundaries.

Extreme fire seasons introduce a different calculation.

A major resort can become an evacuation zone within hours. A coastal road can turn from an essential transport artery into a bottleneck. A destination that is commercially dependent on several weeks of peak-season demand can suffer disproportionate losses from a single major disruption.

Travel warnings add another layer of risk. Advisories concerning the Lokva Rogoznica–Omiš corridor can influence decisions before physical damage has been fully assessed, while insurance costs and property risks add pressure to businesses and local authorities.

The economic adjustment may therefore begin before the next fire. Travellers have more incentive to consider northern European destinations, Alpine resorts or spring and autumn holidays when peak Mediterranean summer travel carries greater disruption risk.

That does not mean Mediterranean tourism disappears. It means its traditional seasonal economics become less predictable.

The same instability is emerging outside tourism. Prolonged drought and extreme heat are already affecting agricultural reliability, while fires destroy crops, topsoil and rural infrastructure. French maize harvests are projected to fall by half, illustrating how a climate emergency can move from forests into food and supply chains.

Infrastructure has to be designed for the new fire behaviour

The most consequential lesson from Omiš may be architectural rather than operational.

Cities and resorts built against forest and scrubland have traditionally treated wildfire protection as a matter of maintaining firebreaks, deploying crews and evacuating when necessary. Those measures remain essential. But they become less reliable when a fire can advance at extraordinary speed under extreme wind conditions.

Urban-wildland boundaries therefore require a different standard of resilience: stronger structural fire protection, evacuation routes that remain usable under rapidly changing conditions, alternative escape mechanisms and infrastructure capable of operating during widespread power failures.

Omiš demonstrated the value of the sea as an evacuation route. That is an unusual asset, but the principle is broader. Civil protection cannot assume that the same road network, vehicles and ground-based resources will remain available throughout a fast-moving disaster.

The emerging model is closer to integrated civil defence than conventional municipal firefighting.

It will require governments to treat wildfire preparedness as infrastructure policy, not simply emergency management. It will also create a growing market for aerial firefighting, amphibious transport, satellite monitoring and resilient communications as states seek capabilities that local fire departments cannot provide alone.

The uncomfortable question is whether European institutions will adapt before the next simultaneous fire season puts several national systems under pressure at once.