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How the Western Balkans Are Joining the EU Energy Market Ahead of Accession

Elise Aranda
Posted September 15, 2026 · 20 views
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How the Western Balkans Are Joining the EU Energy Market Ahead of Accession
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Serbia and North Macedonia’s decision to join the Vertical Corridor gas network marks a fundamental shift: the Western Balkans are being integrated into the EU energy system long before full EU membership. From large-scale smart meter rollouts to new interconnectors, Brussels is expanding Single Market infrastructure south-east—even as initial CBAM carbon tariffs expose sharp trade frictions.

That process is exposing a problem of its own. Infrastructure is being integrated faster than the rules governing trade across it.

Europe’s energy perimeter is moving south-east

The Vertical Corridor is becoming one of the clearest physical expressions of this shift. Its network links Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine and Moldova, with the latest expansion adding North Macedonia and Serbia. The Greek LNG terminals at Alexandroupolis and Revithoussa provide access to seaborne gas, while Azerbaijani supplies enter through the Trans Adriatic Pipeline.

For Serbia and North Macedonia, the strategic implication is straightforward: their future gas options are becoming less dependent on established pipeline relationships and more connected to a diversified European supply system.

The new Greece–North Macedonia and North Macedonia–Serbia interconnectors are each designed for 1.5bn cubic metres a year. Their importance therefore lies not only in the volumes involved, but in the direction of the network. Greece is becoming an increasingly important entry point for gas moving towards the Balkans and further into Central Europe.

That changes the commercial geography of the region.

Greek infrastructure operators and the companies involved in LNG import and transit stand to gain from higher regional flows, while transmission system operators in the Balkans acquire a role in a network designed around multiple supply sources rather than a single dominant route. The longer-term loser is the model of energy dependence in which Russia could exert disproportionate influence through pipeline supply.

This is not enlargement by treaty. It is enlargement by infrastructure.

The grid is being Europeanised from the inside

Gas is only one part of the transformation. Serbia’s electricity network offers a more granular view of how functional integration works.

More than 900,000 Serbian customers — almost one in four — are now connected to smart meters. The programme has received €110mn in EU grants, more than €8mn through the Western Balkans Investment Forum and a €40mn loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. A further 400,000 meters are planned with support from an upcoming European Investment Bank loan.

The technology matters because a modern European electricity market requires more than physical wires between countries. It depends on networks capable of measuring consumption accurately, managing flows and incorporating increasingly distributed sources of electricity. Serbia’s decision to make smart meters mandatory for all new connections is therefore part of a wider process of aligning the domestic grid with European operating practices.

The forthcoming consumer portal, due to launch in autumn 2026, is the visible end of that investment for households. The more consequential change is taking place behind the meter.

Kosovo is undergoing a similar process. EU IPA III funding has allocated €3.24mn to six cross-border infrastructure projects involving Kosovo and North Macedonia. The EBRD is reviewing a further €25mn loan for modernising substations operated by KOSTT, while German and Danish funding is supporting regulatory alignment under the Energy Community.

Taken individually, these projects look like conventional development finance. Together, they amount to something more consequential: European technical standards are being embedded in national energy systems before the countries operating those systems become EU members.

Then came the carbon tariff problem

The contradiction became visible when the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism began applying to electricity imports in 2026.

Instead of making integration smoother, the new carbon rules initially made cross-border electricity trade harder. During the first four months of the year, electricity trade between the EU and the Western Balkans fell by 25%. Exports from non-EU regional countries to the EU declined 8.1%, from 5.01 TWh to 4.60 TWh. Imports from the EU fell much more sharply, by 40.7%, from 5.49 TWh to 3.25 TWh.

The problem was not a lack of physical connectivity. It was the mismatch between the infrastructure being built and the regulatory conditions attached to access to the EU market.

Western Balkan exporters that had not achieved full electricity market coupling faced carbon costs and regulatory requirements that could make cross-border transactions less competitive. A region being drawn into the European electricity system was simultaneously finding part of its trade obstructed by the rules of that same system.

That is why the European Commission moved to amend the electricity provisions before the September 21–25 Sarajevo Energy and Climate Week. The proposed changes would simplify emissions calculations and remove the requirement for direct physical connection in the relevant circumstances. The European Parliament scheduled a vote on the text for September 14.

The episode is an important warning for Brussels. Technical integration cannot simply be switched on independently of the legal architecture around it.

Accession without the accession timetable

This is where the Western Balkans’ energy transformation intersects with the EU’s wider enlargement problem.

For years, the standard model was clear: candidate countries would undertake legislative reforms, complete negotiating chapters and eventually enter the Union, gaining access to the Single Market as members. That model has become increasingly difficult to sustain politically, both inside candidate countries and among EU governments.

A different idea has gained ground in its place: gradual or phased integration. Paris and Berlin have promoted earlier access to parts of the Single Market while maintaining a merit-based approach to formal membership. The concept was reinforced by discussions around the so-called “Helsinki Moment” of enlargement, reflecting the post-2022 pressure to deepen the absorption of candidate states into European structures.

The political resistance to fixed accession deadlines remains real. The boycott of the Montenegro summit by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in June and EU Council decisions in July signalled the preference in some capitals for performance and reform rather than calendar-driven enlargement.

Energy infrastructure provides a way around that impasse.

Brussels does not need unanimous political agreement on a membership date to finance a smart-meter programme, support a substation upgrade or connect a national gas network to an EU-backed corridor. The EBRD, EIB, EU grants, WBIF and IPA III can change the operating environment directly.

The result is a form of integration that is difficult to reverse. Once electricity markets, gas routes and technical standards are interconnected, separation becomes economically more complicated than integration.

The economic incentive is substantial

There is also a material reason for pursuing this model beyond geopolitics.

The IMF estimates that full integration and Single Market access could raise per capita GDP across the Western Balkans and Moldova by 30–35% over a decade. That potential makes market integration more than an institutional substitute for EU membership. It becomes an economic instrument in its own right.

For European governments, it offers another advantage: influence can be exercised through standards, financing and infrastructure rather than only through political negotiations. For candidate countries, access to European networks provides tangible benefits while the question of formal membership remains unresolved.

But the CBAM disruption shows the limits of this approach. A country can be physically connected to Europe and still find itself commercially outside important parts of the market.

That tension will become increasingly important as the region is drawn deeper into the European energy system. The Western Balkans are no longer simply waiting at the EU’s institutional door. They are being wired into the building.

The unresolved question is whether Brussels can make those connections work as a coherent market before political accession catches up with the infrastructure.

Sources: Tovima, EBRD, Euronews, Ground News, Balkan Green Energy News, Adevarul

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