Structural Militarization: Inside Moscow’s Plans for Martial Law and the Revival of Construction Troops

Institutionalizing War: Deliberations Over Martial Law

Reports based on sources within the Russian federal administration, regional authorities, and parliamentary factions indicate that the Kremlin is seriously evaluating the implementation of martial law—or significant statutory elements of it—following the State Duma elections. Supported by influential factions within the Russian security apparatus, this proposal aims to shift the country from a partial wartime posture to a total mobilization of state and economic resources.

According to insider analysis, security hardliners view martial law as a necessary instrument to overcome structural bottlenecks in the ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Mounting frontline attrition, territorial vulnerabilities, and growing difficulties in sustaining volunteer recruitment pipelines have intensified debate within the Kremlin. Advocates argue that maintaining control over an increasingly strained domestic situation requires extraordinary measures.

Under Russian law, martial law must be formally enacted through presidential decree, specifying the exact time of implementation. Crucially, legislation sets no maximum duration for such a state of emergency; its termination requires a separate presidential order. This legal mechanism gives the executive branch unchecked authority to restrict civil liberties, enforce economic requisitions, implement curfews, and mandate labor duty without fixed time limits. Observers note that delaying such radical steps until after the State Duma elections allows the regime to navigate the election period without triggering immediate public unrest, reserving full emergency powers for the post-election landscape.

Expansion of Force Limits and the Re-establishment of Construction Troops

Parallel to the legal considerations for martial law, Vladimir Putin has continued to incrementally increase the authorized personnel limits of the Russian Armed Forces. Following earlier expansions—such as the decree issued on Russia Day, June 12, 2026—the Kremlin has further raised the official strength of the military. Recent adjustments reflect an ongoing trend of elevating active military billets and civil support personnel to accommodate expanding operational needs.

As of July 27, 2026, according to Defence24, the limit is 2,426,130 full-time positions, including 1,535,000 for soldiers and 891,130 for civilian military employees. This means that this time, the number of full-time positions for soldiers has been increased by 25,000 and for military employees by 2,000.

This means that in recent years, since 2016, the number of full-time positions in the Russian Army has increased by over half a million personnel.

This is the third increase in the size of the Russian Army in 2026.

On 24 July, State Duma Defense Committee member Andrey Kartapolov said that a new mass compulsory mobilisation campaign was "not being discussed" and argued that the ranks of contract soldiers continue to grow.

Kartapolov is known for denying that mobilisation was planned just one day before Russia announced it on 21 September 2022. At the time, he described public concerns about mobilisation as "unfounded."

On 26 July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Russian President Vladimir Putin is preparing to launch a new mobilisation campaign this autumn.

According to Zelenskyy, Russia's Defense Ministry recruited 221,000 contract soldiers in the first half of 2026. However, that was not enough to offset battlefield losses, which he said reached 225,500 troops over the same period, including 131,000 killed.

As a result, Putin is expected to announce a new mobilisation drive after the State Duma elections on 20 September, with between 300,000 and 500,000 people potentially being sent to the front, Zelenskyy said.

Re-establishment of Construction Troops

A central element of Russian military expansion is the formal reinstatement of dedicated military construction units, reminiscent of the Soviet-era "construction troops" known as Stroybat. Under newly established organizational frameworks, these specialized units are authorized to include up to 25,000 military positions, 2,000 civil employee posts, and a dedicated ministerial command structure of 200 headquarters roles.

The revival of construction troops highlights a critical logistical bottleneck facing the Russian military establishment. Over years of intensive combat, engineering assets have been heavily depleted while the demand for fortified positions, defensive lines, logistics hubs, and military infrastructure has escalated dramatically. By re-establishing military construction formations, the defense ministry aims to free combat engineering units and regular infantry from rear-area construction duties, funneling specialized labor directly into infrastructure development along both internal security perimeters and occupied territories.

Strategic Implications for Long-Term Mobilization

The convergence of potential martial law and the institutional revival of military construction units signals a broader transition toward a fully militarized command economy. The creation of specialized non-combat military corps provides the Russian state with a formal framework to utilize conscript labor and targeted recruits for heavy industrial and defensive labor without relying entirely on civilian contractors, who are increasingly scarce and expensive in Russia’s tight labor market.

Furthermore, integrating large-scale construction units into the armed forces provides a mechanism to absorb newly mobilized personnel who may lack combat training, placing them directly into critical supporting roles. Combined with the indefinite nature of martial law, these measures create a self-sustaining ecosystem designed to support a prolonged conflict of attrition.