Taiwan Is Preparing for a War Where the First Battle May Be Against Chaos

Taiwan has launched its annual Han Kuang military exercises, but this year the main challenge is not simply whether the island can repel a conventional military attack. Taipei is testing a far more complex scenario: how the state would function if the first strikes were aimed not only at military targets, but also at command systems, communications networks and the ability to make decisions under pressure.

The ten-day drills have become one of Taiwan’s most extensive tests of defence resilience. For the first time, the military is placing greater emphasis on scenarios where commanders must operate with incomplete information, communications may be disrupted, and initial plans can be rapidly overturned by an adversary’s actions. This reflects a broader transformation in how modern warfare is understood: success increasingly depends not only on the amount of military equipment a country possesses, but on whether its institutions can adapt faster than the opponent.

For Taiwan, this shift is a response to the changing nature of the military threat from China. Beijing has intensified pressure around the island in recent years, conducting increasingly complex military exercises that simulate scenarios involving blockades, control of maritime routes and attempts to isolate Taiwan from external support.

When the First Battle Begins Before the First Shot

One of the most significant changes in this year’s Han Kuang exercises is the move away from the idea of a “perfect war” in which all units follow a predetermined plan. Taiwan’s military is testing whether its commanders can make decisions in conditions of uncertainty — when an adversary acts unpredictably and centralised command structures may be disrupted.

This is why Han Kuang has introduced the “backbrief” system, adapted from US military practice. Under this approach, junior officers are required to explain their understanding of assigned missions back to their commanders, ensuring that they grasp the operational objective rather than simply following instructions. For modern warfare, this ability is critical: when communications fail, military units must still be capable of acting independently and maintaining operational effectiveness.

This is one of the key lessons emerging from recent conflicts, from Ukraine to the Middle East. Highly centralised command structures can become a vulnerability in conflicts where an adversary has the ability to target command centres, digital infrastructure and logistical networks before large-scale ground operations even begin.

Taiwan is therefore preparing not only for a confrontation between armed forces. It is preparing for a competition between two systems of governance and command: the one that can preserve its ability to function under attack, and the one that loses the capacity to coordinate first.

The Digital Front Becomes as Important as Sea and Air Power

One of the most revealing elements of this year’s drills is Taiwan’s first-ever deliberate restriction of mobile internet access during Han Kuang exercises. The goal is to assess how military structures and civilians would respond if digital communications became unreliable or unavailable during a crisis.

The scenario reflects a reality of modern warfare in which attacks on information systems can have an impact comparable to physical destruction. Disabling communication networks, spreading disinformation or creating public panic can weaken a state before a major military operation even begins.

That is why Taiwan increasingly views defence as a society-wide system rather than a purely military responsibility. The exercises involve not only armed forces but also civilian institutions, testing how local authorities could maintain essential services during a prolonged crisis. The drills also examine reserve mobilisation, protection of logistics networks and the ability of civilian industries to support national defence needs.

This approach is becoming a defining feature of security planning in countries facing the possibility of major conflict. The separation between military and civilian security is becoming increasingly blurred: energy systems, transport networks, industry, media and digital infrastructure are all becoming part of national defence.

Taiwan Is Adapting to the Lessons of a New Era of Warfare

The transformation of Taiwan’s military planning is taking place alongside a broader shift in defence thinking across Europe and beyond. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that modern conflicts extend far beyond frontline operations. They involve attacks on infrastructure, information warfare, economic pressure and the struggle to maintain state capacity under extreme conditions.

Taiwan is closely watching these developments because a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait would have a different scale but could follow a similar logic. The island cannot rely solely on stopping a much larger military force through direct confrontation. Instead, its strategy increasingly focuses on making any potential aggression difficult, costly and prolonged.

This is why Han Kuang is no longer simply an annual demonstration of military readiness. It is a test of whether a democratic society can preserve decision-making, maintain essential functions and withstand pressure when multiple systems are targeted simultaneously.

From Taiwan to Europe, the Definition of Security Is Changing

The most important message from these exercises extends far beyond East Asia. Taiwan reflects a broader trend reshaping defence planning worldwide: future conflicts will be determined not only by weapons, but by resilience.

The key question is no longer simply whether a country can survive the first strike. More importantly, can it continue making decisions, maintaining its economy, protecting its information space and preserving public trust when pressure reaches its highest point?