Putin’s First Visit to the Kuril Islands Signals the End of Diplomacy With Japan

The Russian president’s itinerary on the island was deliberately ordinary: a fish-processing plant, a hospital, a school, and a meeting with Sakhalin Governor Valery Limarenko. Yet behind this routine facade, the political message was unambiguous. That is a much bigger problem for Tokyo than another diplomatic dispute over four islands.

That is a much bigger problem for Tokyo than another diplomatic dispute over four islands.

The old bargain has run out of road

Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai group have been at the centre of the unresolved Russian-Japanese territorial dispute since the Soviet occupation at the end of the Second World War. Japan calls them the Northern Territories and maintains that they are Japanese territory. The disagreement has been one of the reasons the two countries have never signed a post-war peace treaty.

For years, however, Moscow and Tokyo managed to keep the dispute from destroying the wider relationship. Economic ties continued, and negotiations remained possible even when there was little sign of a breakthrough.

That arrangement began to collapse after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In March 2022, Japan’s government reaffirmed its claim to the islands. Moscow responded by pulling out of peace-treaty negotiations and cancelling the visa-free arrangement for Japanese citizens. Japan then returned to describing the islands as being under “illegal occupation” in its diplomatic Bluebook, a formulation it had not used since 2003.

Putin’s appearance on Iturup takes that deterioration another step.

The issue is no longer simply that Moscow and Tokyo disagree over sovereignty. The Kremlin is now signalling that it has little reason to preserve the diplomatic ambiguity that once surrounded the dispute.

Iturup is becoming a military fact

The island already has the infrastructure to make that message credible. Russia maintains a military airbase there, along with missile systems and a permanent military contingent.

The timing of Putin’s visit matters because it came directly after large-scale Russian naval exercises in the Pacific and Far East. His trip therefore placed a highly political event against an unmistakably military backdrop.

Japan has already been dealing with the consequences. Its fighter aircraft were scrambled 237 times during 2025 to intercept Russian military aircraft. In July this year, Japanese authorities also publicly acknowledged the need to strengthen counter-intelligence measures over Russian activity linked to information gathering and the acquisition of dual-use goods for the war in Ukraine.

Iturup sits close enough to Hokkaido for these developments to have a direct bearing on Japanese defence planning.

The Kremlin does not need to announce a new military deployment for the strategic calculation to change. A permanent Russian presence is already there. Putin’s visit gives that presence political visibility at the highest level.

Tokyo’s response is unlikely to stop at a protest

Japan reacted sharply. Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi said the four southern islands, including Etorofu, form an integral part of Japan under its historical understanding and international law. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi called Putin’s visit “absolutely unacceptable” and said it hurt the feelings of the Japanese people.

For Tokyo, however, the harder question is what comes after the diplomatic protest.

The territorial dispute is now becoming part of a much broader defence problem. Russian forces are positioned close to Hokkaido, Chinese and Russian diplomats have publicly aligned themselves on the post-war territorial order, and North Korea continues to add a separate missile threat to the regional picture.

That combination makes the case for stronger Japanese defence capabilities easier to argue.

Japan is already being pushed towards higher defence spending, longer-range weapons and closer security cooperation with the United States, Australia, Britain and NATO. The more firmly Russia embeds itself in the Kurils, the harder it becomes for Tokyo to treat the Northern Territories as primarily a diplomatic question.

There is a potential cycle here. Russian military activity encourages Japan to strengthen its defences; a stronger Japanese military posture deepens its links with other security partners; Moscow and Beijing can then point to those moves as evidence of a changing regional balance.

The Kurils are becoming one of the places where that cycle is easiest to see.

Moscow and Beijing are speaking in the same language

The joint statement by the Russian and Chinese ambassadors in Tokyo is particularly significant.

The two diplomats warned against attempts to revise the results of the Second World War. Coming immediately after Putin visits territory claimed by Japan, the statement amounted to a public display of diplomatic alignment between Moscow and Beijing.

China gains from the confrontation without having to turn the Kuril dispute into its own territorial conflict. A Japan forced to devote more political and military attention to its northern approaches has fewer resources available elsewhere. Russia, meanwhile, has another reason to rely on Chinese diplomatic backing as its relationship with Tokyo deteriorates.

This is why the Iturup episode cannot be viewed in isolation.

The security map around Japan increasingly contains overlapping Russian, Chinese and North Korean pressures, while Tokyo is building closer links with the US and other Western partners. The island is part of that wider contest.

Energy still gives Tokyo a reason to be careful

There is one important limit to Japan’s ability to respond as aggressively as the security picture might suggest: energy.

Japan remains a major buyer of liquefied natural gas from the Sakhalin-2 project. In 2025, Japanese companies imported about 6m tonnes of LNG from the project, equivalent to roughly 8.2–8.3bn cubic metres and around 9 per cent of Japan’s total LNG imports.

JERA, Tokyo Gas, Tohoku Electric, Kyushu Electric and Osaka Gas are among the main buyers.

That makes a complete and immediate break with Russian energy considerably more difficult than a diplomatic protest. Japan could take a tougher political position while still relying on Russian gas to keep its energy market functioning.

The contradiction is becoming sharper. Security policy is moving in one direction; economic necessity continues to pull in another.

For Moscow, that creates room to believe that political pressure will not automatically produce a complete economic rupture.

The peace treaty is becoming harder to separate from the security contest

There is little in the current trajectory to suggest that a settlement over the islands is becoming easier.

Putin proposed in 2018 that Russia and Japan sign a treaty without preconditions. Tokyo refused to separate the treaty from the sovereignty question. Four years later, Moscow ended the peace-treaty talks altogether.

The Iturup visit does not alter either side’s formal legal position. Japan still claims the Northern Territories; Russia still controls them.

What has changed is the context in which the dispute is being managed.

A territorial disagreement can remain frozen for decades if both governments retain channels for dialogue and have reasons to avoid military escalation. That becomes harder when disputed territory is simultaneously serving as a permanent military position and a symbol of resistance to the opposing side.

For Tokyo, the Northern Territories are increasingly a defence issue on the doorstep of Hokkaido. For Moscow, they are a demonstration of territorial control backed by military power. Beijing’s diplomatic support adds another layer to the confrontation.

The old formula - keep the sovereignty dispute alive while expanding economic cooperation - has become increasingly difficult to sustain. Putin’s arrival on Iturup, following Russian military exercises in the Pacific, makes that shift visible in a way years of diplomatic statements could not.