America Is Rebuilding Its Missile Arsenal After the Iran War Exposed a Strategic Weakness

The United States has awarded Raytheon a $22.9 billion, seven-year contract to dramatically expand production of Tomahawk cruise missiles, in the clearest sign yet that the Iran war has exposed the limits of America’s existing precision-strike stockpiles.

The deal, announced on August 17, will raise annual Tomahawk production from roughly 60 missiles to more than 1,000. It formalises a framework agreement reached between the US military and Raytheon in February, giving the company the long-term certainty needed to invest in manufacturing capacity, equipment and its workforce.

The timing is significant. Washington is not simply expanding its arsenal for a future conflict. It is trying to rebuild stocks already consumed by the ongoing war with Iran, while continuing to supply weapons to allies.

The Iran war has become a production test

The Tomahawk deal comes after months of sustained US military operations against Iran. The conflict has consumed large quantities of long-range precision weapons, including Army Tactical Missile Systems and Precision Strike Missiles.

By early August, US stocks of those systems had been almost exhausted, according to reporting based on people familiar with the military's inventories. Around half of the Navy's global Tomahawk stockpile had also been used during the conflict.

The pressure extends beyond offensive missiles. Patriot and THAAD interceptor inventories have also fallen sharply since the beginning of the war, increasing the strain on a military that must simultaneously protect its forces, sustain operations and preserve enough weapons for potential future conflicts.

This is the central problem revealed by the Iran campaign. The United States has enormous military resources, but its ability to replace sophisticated munitions has not kept pace with the rate at which they can be consumed in a major war.

Washington is moving from procurement to industrial mobilisation

The Raytheon contract reflects a broader change in US defence policy. Instead of relying primarily on annual procurement cycles, Washington is using large, multiyear commitments to persuade defence companies to expand production lines and make investments that would otherwise be considered too risky.

The same approach is being applied to other missile systems. The US military has signed agreements aimed at increasing production of Patriot and THAAD interceptor components, while other major contractors are being encouraged to expand their capacity.

For Raytheon, the scale-up is substantial. Moving from about 60 Tomahawks annually to more than 1,000 represents not merely an increase in orders but a fundamental expansion of the industrial base supporting the weapon.

That distinction matters because modern warfare is increasingly defined by consumption rates. A technologically advanced military may possess highly capable aircraft, ships and missile systems, but those platforms become less useful if their precision weapons cannot be replenished quickly enough.

Europe is watching the American production line

The problem is particularly relevant for Europe because the continent remains heavily dependent on US capabilities for long-range precision strike.

The United Kingdom operates Tomahawks from its submarines, while the Netherlands has received US approval to purchase up to 163 Block V missiles. At the same time, European countries are only beginning to develop a more autonomous long-range strike architecture.

France, Germany, Italy and Poland launched the European Long-Range Strike Approach in 2024, with Sweden and the UK joining later. The initiative is intended to develop European capabilities covering cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 2,000 kilometres. But no specific system has yet been selected, leaving a substantial gap between political ambition and deployable capability.

This gap becomes more important as Washington is forced to replenish its own stocks.

For years, Europe's dependence on American military power was primarily discussed in terms of strategic enablers such as intelligence, airlift, satellite capabilities and nuclear deterrence. The missile shortage exposes another layer of dependence: the ability to sustain a prolonged high-intensity war through continuous weapons production.

The real bottleneck is time

The $22.9 billion contract will eventually increase American production capacity, but money cannot immediately create a functioning industrial ecosystem.

Missile production depends on specialised components, skilled workers, machinery and suppliers that may themselves require years of investment. The US decision to guarantee demand over seven years is therefore designed to solve a structural problem rather than simply fill an immediate inventory gap.

That creates a difficult strategic window.

Washington is rebuilding its arsenal at the same time as Europe is trying to establish its own long-range strike capacity. Both processes will take years, while the lessons from the Iran war are already reshaping defence planning.

The result is a new understanding of military readiness: possessing advanced weapons is no longer enough. The decisive question is how quickly an industrial base can replace them once a major war begins.