New European Security Alliance And Ukraine`s Power

In today’s new reality, we are witnessing a major war in Europe between Russia and Ukraine. This war has broken all previous security paradigms – the standards of NATO, the Pentagon and others.

Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland clearly understand the danger posed by Russia. Other European countries have not yet fully recognised this threat.

Under current conditions, the United States is gradually withdrawing from its role in defending Europe within NATO, reducing its own troop presence and military footprint on the continent. The question of a new security alliance (or alliances) involving Ukraine or even led by Ukraine is becoming increasingly urgent. This article focuses on precisely that issue.

A New Type of War

Modern warfare has fundamentally changed defence and security paradigms. What is happening between Russia and Ukraine has already transformed the principles of conventional warfare. Modern warfare no longer requires massive numbers of tanks, armoured personnel carriers or even artillery.

Under the new conditions, the main role is played by robotic systems – aerial and naval UAVs. Drone and counter-drone technologies, missiles, air defence systems and interceptor systems determine the course of hostilities. Cheap Ukrainian drones are penetrating up to 2,000 kilometres deep into russian territory and striking targets – and this has become the new reality. NATO countries are practically incapable of doing the same – not because they technically cannot, but because they are unwilling to do so.

Ukraine no longer needs American Tomahawk missiles, which are inferior in certain characteristics to the Ukrainian FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile: a range of up to 3,000 km (compared with approximately 1,600 km for the Tomahawk Block V) and a warhead of around 1,150 kg (compared with approximately 450 kg), at a comparable cost. Similarly, the Patriot system is expected to be complemented by the Ukrainian-European Freyja anti-ballistic system – a joint Fire Point project with European partners based on the FP-7.x interceptor missile as a cheaper alternative to Patriot; a prototype is expected in the first half of 2027.

Europe is only beginning to understand how important the hybrid component of modern warfare has become. According to modern Russian military standards, conventional warfare is always accompanied by a hybrid component.

In older wars, the objective was to capture the enemy’s territory; in modern warfare, it is possible to weaken an opponent from within through hybrid attacks in various spheres – informational, political, economic, religious, through social unrest and other means.

The modern context requires drone technologies to be updated every six months, industrial restructuring to meet these conditions, changes in drone frequencies, development of counter-drone technologies, and the use of “kill zones” on the battlefield.

The armed forces of European countries are only beginning to understand these realities, while NATO as an institution has not yet even started to catch up. Individual countries are already developing drones, but such technologies have still not been incorporated into the Alliance’s general protocols.

The conflict in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrated how inexpensive means can be used to attack targets in different countries – for example, through Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles. According to available assessments, in a local conflict the United States used approximately two-thirds of its stockpiles of both strike missiles and air defence interceptors. This appears economically irrational: spending missiles worth $3–5 million to intercept drones costing $20,000–30,000.

Ukrainian specialists are now advising the armed forces of Arab countries on protecting critical facilities in modern warfare. This is a strong signal for all NATO and Pentagon security paradigms: Ukraine has developed technologies that are fully competitive at the global level, and the country itself is rapidly advancing technologically because of this war.

New Security Alliance Configurations

Urgent security assistance is critically necessary for Ukraine, which is fighting an unprecedented war against Russia – a country far superior in economic and military potential.

Ukraine seeks to join the EU and NATO – this is enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine. However, there is reality, and there are aspirations. NATO operates according to clear criteria. In practice, this military alliance has revealed itself not so much as a mechanism for protecting its members, but rather as a club of “elite” states.

In recent years, Russian unmanned aerial vehicles with various objectives have entered the airspace of all NATO countries bordering Russia and Belarus. Russian missiles have also entered the territory of several countries. In November 2022, two civilians were killed in the Polish village of Przewodów (later investigations leaned towards the version that it was caused by a Ukrainian air defence missile). In September 2025, dozens of Russian drones violated Polish airspace. In July 2026, a Russian cruise missile (likely a Kh-101) entered Polish territory approximately 100 kilometres deep – and none of the NATO fighter jets that were deployed managed to intercept it.

In May 2026, a Russian Geran-2 drone (Shahed-type) struck a residential building in the Romanian city of Galați near the Ukrainian border: a fire broke out and two people were injured. This was the first case when a Russian drone caused civilian injuries on NATO territory.

In Germany, drone reconnaissance activities over Bundeswehr bases and logistics hubs have repeatedly been detected; in 2025, military trucks belonging to the Bundeswehr burned down in Erfurt, while pro-Russian channels attributed the arson to “their own people”.

In November 2025, unidentified drones flew over Belgium’s Kleine-Brogel air base, where American B61 nuclear bombs are stored; attempts to jam them were unsuccessful.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), from August 2024 to February 2026, around 144 drone incidents were recorded over the territory of ten NATO countries and Ireland – including military bases, ports, energy facilities and shared nuclear infrastructure.

If all airspace violations by Russia against NATO countries since 2022 are taken into account (Poland, Romania, the Baltic states, Germany and others), the number reaches hundreds of documented cases. At the same time, Russian aircraft (Su-30, MiG-31, Tu-160) and naval vessels regularly violate the airspace and territorial waters of NATO members – Estonia, Lithuania, Norway and others.

NATO almost never provides a symmetrical response: there are no large-scale reconnaissance flights by European UAVs over Russian facilities, and there is no systematic destruction of violators. This illustrates the Alliance’s inability to respond adequately to modern challenges and threats.

There are already several formats of European cooperation – the Schengen Area, the eurozone, the political European Union and others. There is the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) – defence cooperation between five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden). There is also the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) – an informal format bringing together eight countries: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden.

Another format is the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) – an expeditionary force led by the United Kingdom that includes Scandinavian and Baltic countries, the Netherlands and Iceland.

New challenges require an adequate response to Russian aggression – both conventional and hybrid. NATO as a bloc has so far failed to respond adequately.

Another important factor is that major powers do not necessarily benefit from the growth of Ukraine’s subjectivity and strength. They do not want either the weakening or, even more so, the collapse of Russia. Therefore, military assistance to Ukraine has effectively been provided mainly to preserve the status quo rather than to ensure Ukraine’s victory in the war.

Ukraine’s Power

The era when democracy was the main criterion of influence is now fading into the background, while state power is becoming the primary factor – meaning the ability to defend oneself and one’s allies.

The Budapest Memorandum taught Ukraine and the entire world that security guarantees from Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom and other major powers do not work in real situations. When these countries guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, they apparently never truly intended to uphold these commitments.

Ukraine gave up the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world – around 1,900 strategic warheads, more than China currently possesses and more than the United Kingdom and France combined. The reason was that the signatories themselves did not believe a conventional war between parties to the agreement was possible.

The aircraft that Ukraine transferred under these agreements are now being used to strike Ukraine with missiles of the same types that the country once voluntarily surrendered.

Therefore, paper guarantees no longer work. After Trump’s return, trade, economic agreements and democratic procedures also ceased to function in the same way – everything shifted into a “manual control” mode. If previously a country’s influence was determined by two main factors – a strong economy and democratic principles (on which the UN system is based) – this has now changed.

This change has become evident through Ukraine’s war against Russia. In its struggle for survival, Ukraine has learned to fight against a much stronger adversary while having a smaller economy, a smaller army and fewer conventional weapons. This has become possible thanks to both asymmetric responses and the development of advanced technologies that did not exist before this war.

Unique Parameters of Ukraine’s Power

First, Ukraine currently has one of the largest armies in Europe (and according to many estimates, the largest after Russia). According to estimates from 2025–2026, the active strength of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is around 1 million personnel. Other European countries – including Turkey, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Poland and the Baltic states – do not have armed forces of such size.

Second, Ukraine has the capabilities to strike Russia (and potentially any country) with combined air, missile and drone technologies at a depth of up to 3,000 kilometres inside its territory. This makes targets in the Baltic and North Seas potentially reachable. These capabilities are confirmed not by technical specifications in manuals, but by real combat experience – unique advanced military technologies that are relatively inexpensive compared with weapons with similar functions developed by NATO countries.

Third, at sea (and potentially even in ocean operations), Ukraine is capable of sinking any vessel using naval drones or combinations of naval and aerial systems – something already proven through operations in the Azov and Black Seas.

Fourth, Ukraine has demonstrated unique sabotage operations deep behind enemy lines – such as Operation Spider Web in June 2025, when drones launched from Russian territory struck strategic aviation assets of the Russian nuclear triad (Tu-95, Tu-22M3, Tu-160 and others). Around two dozen similar operations have been carried out in recent years. They have placed Ukraine’s intelligence and special operations capabilities among the world’s most advanced.

Fifth, there is the resilience of Ukrainian society, its ability to self-organise and maintain armed resistance against a significantly stronger and better-equipped adversary – even under conditions where the highest levels of government sometimes hinder rather than support these efforts.

The country and its people are capable of a level of self-organisation and resistance that no other European country has demonstrated. According to public opinion surveys, in European countries the willingness to defend one’s country with weapons ranges mostly between 15% and 45% (in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands often below 30%), while in Ukraine this figure reaches around 54–70% (among men – more than 60%).

Conclusion

We are standing on the threshold of major changes in security concepts and paradigms in Europe and across the world. Modern warfare has transformed military technologies, and Ukraine has proven to be the country best prepared for these changes.

The NATO bloc is critically behind these technological developments and continues to operate within the old paradigms of previous wars. In the near future, new security alliances will become increasingly relevant. And without Ukraine, such alliances will no longer be effective.

Potentially, such an alliance in Europe could be created on the basis of the Joint Expeditionary Force, the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8), or as a new alliance stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.